The “Ayodhya” Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and the Right to Religious Liberty by Kapur, Ratna
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 29
Issue 1 Symposium: "The International Law and
Politics of External Intervention in Internal Conflicts"
and Special Issue: "Politics of Religious Freedom"
Article 14
The “Ayodhya” Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and
the Right to Religious Liberty
Ratna Kapur
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
This Special Issue: Articles is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more
information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ratna Kapur, The “Ayodhya” Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and the Right to Religious Liberty, 29 Md. J. Int'l L. 305 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol29/iss1/14
ARTICLE 
305 
 
The “Ayodhya” Case: Hindu Majoritarianism 
and the Right to Religious Liberty 
 
RATNA KAPUR† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Here is a small piece of land (1500 square yards) where angels fear 
to tread . . . It is full of innumerable landmines.” 
 -Justice Sibghat Ullah Khan1  
  The long-standing contest over a 1500 square yard plot of land, 
situated in the city of Ayodhya, located in the district of Faizabad in 
the state of Uttar Pradesh in north India, has become a site where 
religious groups, pilgrims, lawyers, and even gods are battling to 
establish their claims of rightful ownership. The issue has been 
simmering in independent India since its birth in 1947 and arose well 
before that time. The courts have been called upon time and again to 
adjudicate on this fraught issue, where their decisions are not only 
defining the parameters of the right to freedom of religion, but are 
implicated in the very construction of faith and belief.  
 
†    Professor of Law, Jindal Global Law School. This article draws on a 
shorter earlier version published in South Atlantic Quarterly. See Ratna Kapur, A 
Leap of Faith: The Construction of Hindu Majoritarianism Through Secular Law, 
113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 109 (2014). Earlier versions of this article were presented at 
the Politics of Religious Freedom Workshop, supported by Henry R. Luce 
Foundation, in December 2011 in Chiang Mai, Thailand;  Jindal Global Law 
School; the NYU Gallatin School; and Yale Law School. My thanks to all those 
who provided feedback and comments on these occasions. I am grateful for the 
advice, comments, and criticisms of Peter Danchin, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba 
Mahmood, Vasuki Nesiah, Rajeswari Sunder  Rajan, and Winnifred Sullivan. Thanks to Adil Khan for his invaluable research assistance. Thanks also to Mohsin 
Alam Bhatt, Aparna Chandra, Latika Vashist, and Apurva Tripathi for their very 
able research support. 
1. Visharad v. Ahmad, O.O.S., No. 1 of 1989, All. H.C., 4 (2010) (Khan, J.) 
[hereinafter Ayodhya]. The Ayodhya Judgment is a consolidation of opinions from 
1986 and 1989, and these consolidated opinions may sometimes be referred to as 
the “Decision of Honorable Special Full Bench Hearing Ayodhya Matters.” 
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 In this article, I examine how the right to freedom of religion has 
emerged in law, focusing on the 125-year-old property dispute in 
Ayodhya, which Hindu nationalist parties, amongst others, claim as 
the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram. A sixteenth century mosque—
the Babri Masjid—was destroyed by hard-line Hindu activists on 
December 6, 1992, on the grounds that the mosque had been 
constructed by the Mughal Emperor Babur on the site of a twelfth 
century Hindu temple that marked the birthplace of Ram. Various 
legal challenges to the legal title and ownership over the disputed 
land were eventually heard by the Allahabad High Court, the highest 
court in the state of Uttar Pradesh, which delivered its decision on 
September 30, 2010. The majority held that the property in question 
be split three ways, with one portion going to the Muslims and two 
portions going to two of the Hindu parties. More specifically, a one-
third share in the disputed land was given to the idols, which had 
been placed under the central dome of the mosque when it was still 
standing. The decision was based on the central claim put forward by 
the Hindu parties that idols (and the birthplace) were juridical entities 
who could be given legal title to the property and also that the 
disputed site was a place of worship for Hindus and a core ingredient 
of the Hindu faith. One-third share was also given to the Sunni Waqf 
Board, which argued that it held full title to the land where the 
mosque once stood,2 as well as to the Nirmohi Akhara (Group 
without Attachment), which declared that it was the manager and 
guardian of the birthplace of Ram as well as the idols.  
Two of the judges, Justices S.U. Khan and Sudhir Agarwal, held 
that the area where the central dome of the three-domed structure or 
mosque once stood and where the idols were placed belonged to the 
Hindus. Justice Dharam Veer Sharma, the dissenting judge, held that 
the birthplace and the idols were juristic persons and that the disputed 
land in its entirety belonged to both.3 The case raised issues of the 
 
2. A waqf is a gift or donation by a Muslim to a religious, educational, or 
charitable cause. 
3. The existence of a Hindu idol as a juristic person capable of having rights 
and discharging duties through a “next friend,” “best friend,” or trustee was 
established in law as early as 1922. In the common law system, there are two types 
of persons—one natural and the other legal. A natural person is a human being, 
while legal persons (or juristic persons) are beings, things, or objects that are 
treated as persons by law, such as a company, which have the capacity for entering 
into legal relationships. This capacity includes holding property, suing as well as 
being sued in a court of law, as well as to address issues of taxation, allotment of 
land, and alienation of property. The treating of Hindu idols as juristic personalities 
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construction of the meaning of secularism and the right to freedom of 
religion in Indian constitutional discourse and the construction of 
religious identity, as well as the essential or core practices of both the 
Hindu and Muslim faith in law. Given the centrality of the historicity 
of the claims of all parties as well as the structures to the case, the 
construction of the historical narrative was also implicated in the 
decision.  
 I discuss how the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court 
judgement partly resulted in reproducing and reinforcing Hindu 
majoritarianism through its interpretation of the right to freedom of 
religion and the broader implications of the decision on the meaning 
and definition of secularism in Indian constitutional discourse. I also 
underscore how the law and judicial discourse has played a central 
role in enabling the Hindu Right, a right wing political and 
ideological movement intent on establishing India as a Hindu State 
and a key player in the Ayodhya dispute, to successfully pursue its 
agenda through the right to freedom of religion. In making a muscular 
and robust argument in favour of its own collective right to worship 
at the spot in Ayodhya designated as the “Ramjanmabhoomi,” or the 
place where god was born, based on the idea that it is a core or 
essential ingredient of the Hindu faith, the Hindu Right has been able 
to define the parameters of the Hindu faith as monotheistic and 
institutionalised. They have also succeeded in diminishing the rights 
of worship of the Muslim minority community. Their interventions 
are justified in and through the discourse of secularism in ways that 
seem reasonable, logical, and highly persuasive, while at the same 
time based on Hindu majoritarianism.  
My discussion illustrates how the enemies of religious pluralism 
are increasingly and successfully waging their war not simply in 
opposition to the rights of religious minorities, but in and through the 
legal discourse of secularism, and quite specifically, the right to 
freedom of religion. In the mammoth decision of the Allahabad High 
Court, the right to freedom of religion became the court’s focus, 
 
requires a “next friend” to represent the idol in any legal or other proceeding. See, 
e.g., Vidya Varuthi Thirthia Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar, A.I.R 1922 P.C. 123 
(India) (holding that a Hindu deity is a juristic person); Sri Radhakhanta Deb v. 
Comm’r of Hindu Religious Endowments, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 798 (India) (where the 
Supreme Court recognized a Hindu deity as a juristic person); Shiromani Gurdwara 
Parbandhak Comm. Amritsar v. Som Nath Dass, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1421 (India) 
(finding the mosque and Sikh scriptures to be juristic persons); Sri Adi 
Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1997) 4 
S.C.C. 606 (India) (where the court recognized the right of a deity to move the 
court in a case involving a challenge to the Kashi Temple Act of 1983). 
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despite the fact that the case was primarily a dispute about title to 
property and not a constitutional matter. I offer a detailed account of 
the arguments presented by the respective parties in an effort to 
unravel the ways in which the right to freedom of religion as 
manifested in the Ayodhya case has long lasting implications on the 
meaning of secularism in India as well as on the ways in which 
religion itself is shaped and constructed through the discourse of 
secularism and the right to freedom of religion. 
The struggle over the meaning of the right to freedom of religion 
has also involved a struggle over the contours and content of religion. 
Quite specifically, it has involved a contest over the meaning of 
Hinduism and a battle over what constitutes its core or essential 
elements. A number of scholars have located the definition of 
Hinduism within the colonial context, arguing that Hinduism is a 
colonial construction adopted by the Europeans as a name for the 
religions of India towards the end of the eighteenth century.4 The 
constructionists have argued that the attributes of Hinduism were 
based on Christian understandings of what constituted religion, and 
focused on those properties that were regarded as usually associated 
with a religion, that is sacred texts, doctrines and priests.  While these 
features could be attributed to a Brahmanical tradition, they came to 
be imagined as the beliefs and practices of the people of the 
subcontinent and formed one pan-Indian religion.  
Similarly, in the context of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth-century anti-colonial struggles, Hindu nationalists sought to 
retrieve an authentic past based on Hindu traditions and practices as 
the basis for constructing the identity of the newly emerging Indian 
 
4. See, e.g., Richard King, Orientalism and the Modern Myth of ‘Hinduism,’ 
46 NUMEN 146, 146 (1999) (arguing that the construction of the concept of 
“Hinduism” as a single religion was based on Christian presuppositions); See also 
Gauri Viswanathan, Colonialism and the Construction of Hinduism, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO HINDUISM 1, 23-44  (Gavin Flood ed., 2003) 
(cautioning against explaining the idea of Hinduism as a hegemonic religion 
exclusively as an outcome of colonial intervention in tradition); David Ludden, 
Ayodhya: A Window on the World, in CONTESTING THE NATION: RELIGION, 
COMMUNITY, AND THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRACY IN INDIA, 1, 6–8 (David Ludden 
ed.,1996) (“Under British rule, ‘Hindu’ became a category for people in India who 
were not Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, Buddhists, or others.”). See 
generally RICHARD KING, ORIENTALISM AND RELIGION: POSTCOLONIAL 
THEORY, INDIA AND “THE MYSTIC EAST” (1999); RETHINKING RELIGION IN 
INDIA: THE COLONIAL CONSTRUCTION OF HINDUISM (Esther Bloch et al. eds., 
2011). 
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nation-state.5  This move was in part an effort to counter the colonial 
representation of India as a barbaric and civilizationally backward 
society because of its beliefs, practices, and traditions, a move that 
simultaneously served as a justification for the continuance of 
colonial rule. While there was a Brahmanical collaboration with the 
Hindu nationalist movement at the time of independence that led to 
the sanskritization, textualization, and unification of so-called Hindu 
traditions, what is significant is that this construction was thoroughly 
modern in its genesis.6 These contests over the core or essential 
ingredients of religion continue to play out doctrinally in law in the 
contemporary period through the “essential practices” test.7 
This paper is divided into three sections. In the first part, I set out 
the constitutional jurisprudence on Indian secularism, briefly 
summarizing three significant decisions of the Indian Supreme Court: 
the Bommai decision,8 a cluster of decisions collectively described as 
 
5. See generally VINAYAK DAMODAR SAVARKAR, HINDUTVA: WHO IS A 
HINDU? (1929); MADHAV SADASHIV GOLWALKAR, WE OR OUR NATIONHOOD 
DEFINED (1939); Christophe Jaffrelot, The Idea of the Hindu Race in the Writings 
of Hindu Nationalist Ideologues in the 1920s and 1930s: A Concept Between Two 
Cultures, in THE CONCEPT OF RACE IN SOUTH ASIA 327–54 (Peter Robb ed., 1995). 
6. See generally GEOFFREY A. ODDIE, IMAGINED HINDUISM: BRITISH 
PROTESTANT MISSIONARY CONSTRUCTIONS OF HINDUISM, 1793–1900 (2006); 
WENDY DONIGER, THE HINDUS: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY (2009) (discussing 
the wide range of texts and unwritten traditions that challenge the idea of a 
monolithic tradition); LATA MANI, CONTENTIOUS TRADITIONS: THE DEBATE ON 
SATI IN COLONIAL INDIA 2–7 (1998) (describing the effect colonialism had in 
shaping the perception of India’s history). 
7. See RONOJOY SEN, ARTICLES OF FAITH: RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND THE 
INDIAN SUPREME COURT 40–72 (2010).    
The historical basis for the “essential practices” test is found in the colonial era 
where the colonial courts attempted to identify and define religious identities and in 
the process augment their role in disciplining and managing each community. In 
the process they also ended up constructing in law the very religious identities that 
they were regulating. In the contemporary moment, the “essential practices” test 
was largely developed by Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Chief Justice of India from 
1964 to 1966, to expunge superstitious and irrational elements from different 
religions and provide them with a rational basis. As discussed later in this paper, in 
the context of Hinduism, this process resulted in producing a modern, monotheistic, 
and institutionalized tradition in line with other Abrahamic traditions. In the 
process of trying to demarcate the line between religion through the essential 
practices test, as distinct from the secular functions of religious denominations in 
which the State could interfere, the courts were drawn into inquiring into the 
contents of religious beliefs and in the process to actually construct the tradition as 
well as the religious identity.  
8. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1 (India) (involving a 
challenge to the validity of the presidential declaration dismissing the governments 
in four states led by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) (Indian People’s Party), the 
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the Hindutva cases,9 and Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India.10 In the 
second part, I discuss the Ayodhya case, setting out the background to 
the dispute and the competing legal claims of the respective parties. 
In the third section, I discuss the reasoning and holdings of each of 
the three judges in the decision of the Special Full Bench Hearing of 
the Ayodhya property dispute, which consisted of four suits, by the 
High Court of Allahabad in 2010.11 In the final part, I examine the 
implications of the Ayodhya decision on the meaning of the right to 
freedom of religion as well as its implications on the meaning of 
secularism in India. While the Supreme Court of India has 
subsequently stayed the decision of the Allahabad High Court,12 the 
 
political wing of the Hindu Right, following the destruction of the Babri mosque at 
Ayodhya in December 1992 and the ensuing communal riots). In Bommai, the 
Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the declaration, 
and in so doing passed considerable comment on the meaning of secularism in 
Indian constitutional life. Id.  
9. The Hindutva cases involved a series of challenges to the election of Shiv 
Sena (foot soldiers of Shiva) and BJP candidates in the December 1987 State 
elections in Maharashtra on the grounds that the candidates had committed corrupt 
practices in violation of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 
Section 123(3) of the Act prohibits candidates from any appeal to his or her 
religion, race, caste, community, or language to further his or her prospect for 
election or for prejudicially affecting the election of any other candidate. The 
collection of thirteen cases that came before the Supreme Court of India include 
Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Pati, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 169 (India); Ramesh 
Yashwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kasinath Kunte, A.I.R. 1996 1 S.C. 1113 (India); 
Bal Thackeray v. Prabhakar Kasinath Kunte, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 130 (India); 
Ramchandra G. Kapse v. Haribansh Ramakbal Singh, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 206 (India); 
Pramod Mahajan v. Haribansh Ramakbal Singh, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 206 (India); 
Sadhvi Ritambhara v. Haribansh Ramakbal Singh, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 206 (India); 
Ramakant Mayekar v. Smt. Celine D’Silva, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 399 (India);  Chhagan 
Bhujbal v. Smt. Celine D’Silva, 1 S.C.C. 399 (India); Pramod Mahajan v. Smt. 
Celine D’Silva, 1 S.C.C. 399 (India); Balasaheb Thackeray v. Smt. Celine D’Silva, 
1 S.C.C. 399 (India); Moreshwar Save v. Dwarkadas Yashwantrao Pathrikar, 
(1996) 1 S.C.C. 394 (India); Chandrakanta Goyal v. Sohan Singh Jodh Singh 
Kohli, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 378 (India); Shri Suryakant Venkatrao Mahadik v. Smt. 
Saroj Sandesh Naik, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 384 (India). 
10. A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 605 (India). 
11. Gopal Singh Visharad v. Zahoor Ahmad, O.O.S., No. 1 of 1989, All. H.C. 
(India); Nirmohi Akhara v. Baboo Priya Datt Ram, O.O.S., No. 3 of 1989, All. 
H.C. (India); Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, U.P v. Gopal Singh Visharad, O.O.S., 
No. 4 of 1989, All. H.C. (India); Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman v. Rajendra Singh, 
O.O.S., No. 5 of 1989, All. H.C. (India). The judgment was delivered in the High 
Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench), on September 30, 2010.  
12. Appeals against the High Court decision were filed by all sides of the case, 
including Hindu and Muslim organizations, and the Court directed the parties to 
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decision remains relevant in terms of its ability to influence the 
understanding and meaning of secularism in both judicial and popular 
discourse.  
I.  THE JUDICIAL (RE)SHAPING OF INDIAN SECULARISM  
Increasingly, the struggle over the meaning of secularism and the 
place of religion has been fought out in the legal arena. This section 
focuses on three significant Supreme Court decisions that highlight 
this contest, including Bommai, the Hindutva cases, and Ismail 
Faruqui v. Union of India. The increasing influence of the Hindu 
Right, which has become a central player in defining the scope and 
parameters of the various components of secularism in law in India, 
has exposed how the discourse can be used to advance a majoritarian 
political agenda. The Hindu Right consists of three primary actors, 
including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Indian Peoples Party), 
which is responsible for formulating and pursuing the political 
agenda of the movement; the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 
(National Volunteer Organization), which was established in 1925 to 
build a strong Hindu community to counter British rule as well as 
Muslim separatism and responsible for developing and expounding 
the ideological doctrine of the Hindu Right; and the Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad (VHP) (World Hindu Council), founded in 1964 to 
popularize the Hindu Right’s religious doctrine and consolidate its 
support at a grassroots level.13 The VHP also includes a militant 
youth wing, the Bajrang Dal (Hanuman gang) established in 1984.14 
There are several other peripheral players associated with the Hindu 
right parties, including the militant and virulently anti-Muslim Shiv 
Sena (Foot soldiers of Shiva).15 The movement collectively promotes 
the ideology of Hindutva—which posits Hinduism not simply as a 
religion but as a nation and a race that is indigenous to India.16 This 
 
maintain the status quo at the site, although it added that the Hindu prayers 
currently being conducted at the makeshift temple on the dispute cite could 
continue without interference. The stay was granted on the grounds that the High 
Court, in partitioning the land, had granted a relief that no party had requested. The 
decision is to be listed before a larger bench of the Supreme Court for arguments.  
13. Ratna Kapur, Normalizing Violence: Transitional Justice and the Gujarat 
Riots, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 885, 890–91 (2006). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. See generally JYOTIRMAYA SHARMA, HINDUTVA: EXPLORING THE IDEA OF 
HINDU NATIONALISM (2003). See also CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT, THE HINDU 
NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN INDIA 27 (1998) (discussing V.D. Savarkar’s 
definition of Hindutva as “an ethnic community possessing a territory and sharing 
the same racial and cultural characteristics”).  
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logic has allowed the ideologues of the Hindu Right to construct 
Muslims and Christians as foreigners, aliens, and invaders and their 
religious presence in the country as a threat to the Hindu nation.17 
While the movement has been variously labeled as, inter alia, Hindu 
fundamentalist, Hindu fascist, and Hindu nationalist, I use the term 
“Hindu Right” to indicate the anti-Muslim, communal as well as 
highly conservative nature of the movement’s agenda.18  
A.   Indian Secularism 
The Ayodhya decision and the meaning ascribed to the right to 
freedom of religion in India need to be understood against the 
backdrop of competing understandings of secularism and the 
emergence of the Hindu Right. The separation of religion from the 
state, and state neutrality in the sphere of religion (sarva dharma 
nirpekshtha), has not informed the dominant understanding of 
secularism in India.19 The state neutrality model does not prohibit the 
making of laws that protect the rights of religious minorities, 
including, for example the regulation of free speech through hate 
speech laws to prevent hatred and violence against religious and other 
 
17. Supra note 5. V. D. Savarkar was the ideological leader of the Hindu 
nationalists during the struggle for freedom from colonial rule. He later became 
leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, a Hindu communalist party that was intensely 
involved in the Independence struggle. His writings on Hindutva continue to 
represent the ideological foundations of the contemporary Hindu Right. See 
SAVARKAR, supra note 5, at 3–4, 92. Savarkar asserted that for Hindus the 
fatherland (pitribhumi) and religious land (punyabhumi) are the same. Muslims on 
the other hand have their religious fealties elsewhere, (i.e. Mecca) and hence are 
not part of the same civilizational fabric. M.S. Golwalkar was an active member of 
the RSS, the ideological wing of the Hindu Right. He became the second Supreme 
Chief (Sarsangchalak) of the RSS from 1940-1973 and a major exponent of the 
ideological doctrine to establish India as a Hindu State (Rashtra). See generally 
GOLWALKAR, supra note 5; M.S. GOLWALKAR, BUNCH OF THOUGHTS 130 
(1966) (where he called upon the religious minorities to give up their “foreign 
mental complexion and merge in the common stream of our national life.”).  
18. See generally TAPAN BASU ET AL., KHAKI SHORTS AND SAFFRON 
FLAGS (1993) (discussing the history and political thought of the Hindu Right).  
19. The Resolution on Fundamental Rights and Economic and Social Change 
was adopted in 1931 in Karachi, which provided: “The state shall observe 
neutrality in regard to all religions.” See also Asghar Ali Engineer, Secularism in 
India—Theory and Practice, in SECULARISM AND LIBERATION: PERSPECTIVES 
AND STRATEGIES FOR INDIA TODAY 38, 44–45 (Rudolf C. Heredia & Edward 
Mathias eds., 1995) (“The Indian state, hence could not remain indifferent to 
religion, and in the Indian situation secularism would mean equal protection to all 
religions so far as the state was concerned.”). 
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minorities or state support to state recognized religions. This liberal 
democratic understanding of secularism does however prohibit state 
involvement in the sphere of religion. This model is based on the 
assumption that these protections emanate from a neutral state—it 
does not acknowledge the presence of majoritarianism as structuring 
secularism and thus the position of the state.20 
In contrast, since independence, almost all debates on the subject 
of secularism have been based on the idea of equal treatment of all 
religions (sarva dharma sambhava) within both the public and 
private spheres.21 Like the liberal democratic vision of secularism, 
 
20. It is important to recognize that this dominant concept of secularism based 
on the notion of separation from religion and state is a contested one that many 
critics have questioned, challenged and rejected. See generally TALAL ASAD, 
FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 181–204 
(2003) (examining secularism in reference to formation of modern 
nationalism); ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, THE POLITICS OF SECULARISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13–14 (2007) (looking beyond the contemporary 
European view of secularism as the separation of church and state); CRAIG 
CALHOUN ET AL., INTRODUCTION, IN RETHINKING SECULARISM 1, 3– 27 (Craig 
Calhoun et al. eds., 2011) (discussing how the assumptions about secularism 
have recently come under scrutiny).  
21. The argument that secularism in India does not mean a wall of separation 
between religion and politics, but rather, the equal respect of all religions is 
common throughout the legal literature. See Engineer, supra note 19, at 40. 
Engineer argues that the western concept of secularism, which involves 
indifference to religion, has never taken root in India. Id. According to Engineer, 
“[t]he concept of secularism in India emerged, in the context of religious pluralism 
as against religious authoritarianism in the west . . . . It was religious community, 
rather than religious authority, which mattered in the Indian context.” Id. It is 
important to recognize that this dominant understanding of Indian secularism also 
remains. See also R.L. CHAUDHARI, THE CONCEPT OF SECULARISM IN INDIAN 
CONSTITUTION 169–70 (1987) (“[T]he absence of complete separation between the 
State and the Religion is because of the character of Indian Society which is 
basically religious. . . . Separation of the State from the religion is not the basis of 
Indian Secularism, as it is in other countries. Indian Constitution does not reject 
religion. On the contrary, it respects all religions.”); T.N. Madan, Whither Indian 
Secularism, 27 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 667, 677 (1993) (stating that Indian secularism 
“stands for equal respect for all religious faiths”); Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis of 
Indian Secularism, 14 J. DEMOCRACY, OCT. 2003, at 11, 13 (stating that while the 
constitution granted freedom of religion and provided rights to religious minorities, 
the constitution was not religiously neutral). See also GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, 
THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA’S SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 91–121 (2003) (providing a comparative analysis and discussing the 
difference between Indian secularism from the U.S. and Israeli models).  
314 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:305 
 
 
the Indian model is based on equality and freedom of religion.22 
However, unlike the liberal model, the Indian model does not adopt a 
position of state neutrality.23 The state can interfere to promote equal 
treatment of all religions. This concept was propounded by Mahatma 
Gandhi and has been the governing model of secularism in 
postcolonial India.24 
Within the context of Indian constitutional law and discourse, 
discussions of secularism typically focus on the right to freedom of 
religion and the right to equality. The literature typically highlights 
the various provisions of the Constitution that are considered relevant 
to the principle of the equal respect of all religions: Articles 14–15 
guaranteeing the right to equality and non-discrimination;25 Articles 
25–26 guaranteeing the right to freedom of religion and the right of 
religious denominations to organize their own affairs;26 Article 30 
 
22. Brenda Cossman & Ratna Kapur, Secularism’s Last Sigh?: The Hindu 
Right, the Courts, and India’s Struggle for Democracy, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 113, 
141 (1997).  
23. See id. at 141–42 (discussing how India has adopted its own distinct 
version of secularism which does not separate state and religion but rather respects 
all religions). 
24. Id. at 142.  See generally DONALD EUGENE SMITH, INDIA AS A SECULAR 
STATE (1963) (discussing the contested approaches to secularism in India).  
25. Article 14 provides: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before 
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” INDIA 
CONST., art. 14. Article 15 provides:  
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them; (2) No citizen 
shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of 
them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with 
regard to—(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of 
public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads 
and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds 
or dedicated to the use of the general public; (3) Nothing in this article 
shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and 
children; (4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall 
prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement 
of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 
Id. art. 15.  
26. Id. arts. 25–26. These constitutional guarantees contemplate both 
individual and collective rights to freedom of religion that extend well beyond the 
limited right to worship. Article 25 enshrines the right to individual freedom of 
religion, but also permits the state to regulate the “economic, financial, political or 
other secular activity which may be associated with religions practice” and to 
specifically intervene in Hindu religious institutions. Id. art. 25. The right under 
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prohibiting religious instruction in state schools, or taxation in 
support of any particular religion; 27 and Article 51A, prohibiting the 
establishment of a state religion.28 The right to equality and the right 
to freedom of religion are, within this vision, seen as fundamentally 
interconnected—that is, all citizens must have the equal right to 
freedom of religion and the State must not discriminate on the basis 
of religion. Following from the dominant understanding of 
secularism as equal treatment of all religions, the constitutional 
discourse does not insist on a wall of separation between religion and 
politics.29 Rather, discussions tend to emphasize the principle of 
toleration—that is, the equal toleration of all religions, and Articles 
30 and 51A are generally highlighted.30 The constitutional guarantees 
on equality and freedom of religion that are seen to frame this 
 
Article 26(a) is a group right and available to every religious denomination. Article 
26(b) guarantees every religious denomination the right “to manage its own affairs 
in matters of religion.” Id. art. 26(b). “The expression ‘matters of religion’ includes 
‘religious practices, rites and ceremonies essential for the practicing of religion.’” 
Articles 25 and 26 accord primacy to public interest over religious claims and 
hence provide a wide margin of appreciation for the State to sponsor reforms. 
27. Article 30 provides: 
(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the 
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 
 
(1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any 
property of an educational institution established and administered by a 
minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount 
fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property 
is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that 
clause. 
 
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, 
discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is 
under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or 
language. 
INDIA CONST., art. 30.  
28. See id. art. 51(A)(e) (“It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to 
promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of 
India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities.”). 
29. See, e.g., P.B. Gajendragadkar, Secularism: Its Implications for Law and 
Life in India, in SECULARISM: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND LIFE IN INDIA 1, 
4 (G.S. Sharma ed., 1966) (“The State does not owe loyalty to any particular 
religion as such; it is not irreligious or anti-religion; it gives equal freedom for all 
religions and holds that the religion of the citizen has nothing to do in the matter of 
socio-economic problems.”).  
30. See, e.g., S.P. Sathe, Secularism, Law and the Constitution of India, in 
SECULARISM IN INDIA 39, 45–46 (M.S. Gore ed., 1991); see also Upendra Baxi, 
The “Struggle” for the Redefinition of Secularism in India: Some Preliminary 
Reflections, in SECULARISM AND LIBERATION, supra note 19, at 54, 61–62.  
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principle of equal toleration are also again highlighted. Secularism in 
the constitution can then be seen to be characterized by three 
principles: (1) freedom of religion; (2) equality and non-
discrimination; and (3) toleration. Toleration thus comes to displace 
neutrality that is present in the model of secularism based on a 
separation of religion and state as the third principle of secularism. 
Although there are some echoes to the principle of neutrality within 
constitutional discourse, these discussions tend to infuse the concept 
of neutrality with the spirit of saarva dharma samabhava or equal 
treatment of all religions. Neutrality to all religions tends not to be 
associated with a wall of separation, as it is in the American or 
French contexts, but rather with the idea that the State must not 
discriminate against any religion. It is this subtle but important shift 
from neutrality to toleration that captures the essence of the equal 
treatment of all religions vision of secularism in post-colonial India 
and its conceptualization of the appropriate relationship between 
religion and state. In stark contrast to the liberal democratic model, 
which insists that the relationship must be characterized by non-
intervention, the equal respect of all religions model allows for state 
intervention in religion, provided that such intervention is in 
accordance with the requirements of equality and freedom of 
religion.31  
The meaning to be given to secularism in India depends to a 
large extent on the meaning given to each of these constituting 
principles. To some extent, the meaning of secularism turns on the 
meaning of equality. If equality is understood in the formal sense—
treating likes alike—then secularism will insist on treating India’s 
various religious communities alike. By contrast, if equality is 
understood in a more substantive sense—of addressing 
disadvantage—then secularism will allow for an accommodation of 
difference between religious groups and the rights of religious 
minorities. In law, Indian secularism has, to a large extent, been 
based on a more substantive approach to the principle of equal 
treatment and toleration of all religions, which has allowed for the 
protection of religious minority rights, including special provisions 
 
31. SMITH, supra note 24, at 133. Smith has argued that the third principle of 
liberal democratic secularism regarding the “[s]eparation of religion and state 
includes two distinct principles: (1) the non-interference of the state and religious 
organizations in each other’s affairs; (2) the absence of a legal connection between 
the state and a particular religion. The Indian Constitution . . . does not subscribe to 
the first principle; it does, however, uphold the second.” Id. at 132. 
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under the Constitution. Some of these provisions include the rights of 
religious minorities to establish and administer their own educational 
institutions,32 to personal status laws, as well as the special 
autonomous status for the Muslim dominated state of Kashmir.33 
B.   The Role of the Hindu Right 
The Hindu Right has increasingly been trying to cast itself as the 
true inheritors of India’s secular tradition. Secularism in its vision 
requires that all religious communities be treated the same. Any laws 
that are designed to protect the rights of religious minorities are 
attacked as “special treatment” and as a violation of the constitutional 
mandate of equal treatment.34 The vision of secularism within the 
discourse of the Hindu Right comes to equate secularism with a 
Hindu state.35 This vision requires that religious minorities must be 
treated the same as the Hindu majority (i.e., where those religious 
minorities are effectively assimilated into the Hindu majority), and 
that any protection of the rights of religious minorities amounts to 
“appeasement,” and a violation of the “true spirit” of secularism. By 
emphasizing the model of formal equality—that is, the formal equal 
treatment of all religions—the Hindu Right’s vision of secularism 
operates as an unmodified majoritarianism whereby the majority 
Hindu community becomes the norm against which all others are to 
be judged and treated.36 The result is that the project of secularism 
becomes a project about assimilating religious minorities rather than 
about the protection of the rights of religious minorities. Secularism 
ends up as a powerful tool in the Hindu Right’s quest for discursive 
political power.37 Armed with the ideology of Hindutva, the Hindu 
 
32. INDIA CONST., art. 30.  
33. Id. art. 370. 
34. Ratna Kapur, The Fundamentalist Face of Secularism and Its Impact on 
Women’s Rights in India, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 323, 326 (1999) (“Any protection 
of the rights of religious minorities is cast as ‘appeasement’ and a violation of the 
‘true spirit’ of secularism.”).  
35. Id. (“Religious minorities are to be treated the same as the majority. Within 
this formal approach to equality, then, the majority becomes the norm against 
which all others are judged. Secularism, then is no longer about the protection of 
rights of religious minorities, but rather, becomes about the assimilation of 
minorities.”).  
36. See generally Cossman & Kapur, supra note 22 (discussing in detail the 
Hindu Right’s pursuit of secularism in and through liberal rights discourse).  
37. See, e.g., Balraj Madhok, Secularism: Genesis and Development, in 
SECULARISM IN INDIA: DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES 110 (M. M. Sankhdher ed., 
1992); Gyan Prakash, Secular Nationalism, Hindutva, and the Minority, in THE 
CRISIS OF SECULARISM IN INDIA 177 (Anuradha Dingwaney Needham & Rajeswari 
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Right has argued that, unlike Christianity and Islam, Hinduism is the 
only religion in India that is committed to the value of religious 
tolerance because it does not aim to proselytize or gain converts. 
According to this logic, since secularism is about toleration, and only 
Hindus are tolerant, then only Hindus are truly secular. The principle 
of protecting minorities virtually disappears.  
 The Supreme Court has been called upon to adjudicate on the 
competing understandings of secularism being advanced by different 
actors. In particular, it has been called upon to decide whether the 
strategies of the Hindu Right violate previous instantiations of this 
basic constitutional principle. 
C.  The Bommai Decision 
Initially, the Supreme Court’s position on secularism differed 
substantially from that promoted by the Hindu Right. The key 
political moment that drew international attention to Ayodhya 
occurred on December 6, 1992, when the self-described “foot-
soldiers” of the Hindu Right destroyed a sixteenth century mosque, 
the Babri Masjid, on the grounds that it had been constructed on the 
exact spot where Ram was born.38  The act of vandalism not only 
resulted in the complete demolition of an historical edifice, but also 
constituted a direct assault on the rights of religious minorities.39  In 
light of the resulting violence that followed the destruction of the 
mosque and subsequent aggravation of religious tensions, presidential 
rule was declared in four states ruled by the BJP.40  Presidential rule 
allows the federal government to dismiss the state government when 
there is a perceived breakdown or failure in the constitutional 
functioning of a state.41 In a subsequent challenge to this decision, the 
 
Sunder Rajan, eds., 2007);  SHABNUM TEJANI, INDIAN SECULARISM: A SOCIAL AND 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 1890-1950 10–11 (2008).  
38. See THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, 1528–2003: A MATTER OF 
NATIONAL HONOUR 1–6 (A.G. Noorani ed., 2003) (describing the 1992 
destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque); Nandini Rao & C. Rammanohar Reddy, 
Ayodhya, the Print Media and Communalism, in DESTRUCTION AND 
CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 139, 147 (Robert Layton et al. eds., 2001) 
(same).  
39. Id.  
40. See THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 4 (stating that the state 
was brought under presidential rule).  
41. INDIA CONST., art. 356. Under presidential rule, the central government 
rules the state through the governor of the state, the official representative of the 
president at the state level.  
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Supreme Court in 1994 upheld the declaration of presidential rule in 
all four states.42  
In the Bommai decision the full constitutional bench of the 
Supreme Court declared the integral importance of the place of 
secularism in the Constitution.43  In the course of lauding the 
importance of secularism based on religious tolerance and equal 
treatment of all religious groups, the Supreme Court also strongly 
condemned the political forces committed to undermining a more 
pluralistic instantiation of this constitutional ideal.44  The Court 
remarked on the distinctness of the concept of secularism in India—
that is, the equal treatment of all religions and tolerance.45  For 
example, Justice Sawant echoed the common view that in India 
secularism does not involve a complete separation of religion and the 
state, but rather the notion of treating all religions equally:  
[T]he ideal of a secular State in the sense of a State 
which treats all religions alike and displays 
benevolence towards them is in a way more suited to 
the Indian environment and climate than that of a truly 
secular State by which [is] meant a state which creates 
complete separation between religion and the State.46 
 
42. See S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 2 S.C.C. 1 (India) 
(establishing a significant precedent on the limits of Article 356 and stipulating the 
circumstances under which presidential rule could be declared). See Praveen 
Swami, Protecting Secularism and Federal Fair Play, FRONTLINE, Nov. 14, 1997, 
(Magazine), available at http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1422/14220170.htm.  
43. Bommai, (1994) 2 S.C.C. 1. 
44. Id.  
45. The opinions in Bommai were delivered by Justice Sawant, with Justices 
Kuldip and Singh concurring; Justice Jeevan Reddy, with Justices Agrawal and 
Pandian concurring; and Justice Ramaswamy.  
46. Bommai, (1994) 2 S.C.C. at 146 (Sawant, J.). Justice Sawant further wrote: 
[S]ecularism under our Constitution is that whatever the attitude of the 
State towards the religions, religious sects and denominations, religion 
cannot be mixed with any secular activity of the State. In fact, the 
encroachment of religion into secular activities is strictly prohibited. This 
is evident from the provisions of the Constitution to which we have made 
reference above. The State’s tolerance of religion or religions does not 
make it either a religious or a theocratic State. When the State allows 
citizens to practice and profess their religions, it does not either explicitly 
or implicitly allow them to introduce religion into non-religious and 
secular activities of the State. The freedom and tolerance of religion is 
only to the extent of permitting pursuit of spiritual life which is different 
from the secular life…. This is also clear from sub-section (3) of Section 
123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951… [and] sub-section 
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This understanding of secularism as based on both religious 
tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups, included an 
assurance of the protection of life, property, and places of worship for 
all religious groups. According to Justice Sawant, any act of state 
government “calculated to subvert or sabotage secularism as 
enshrined in our Constitution, can lawfully be deemed to give rise to 
a situation in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on 
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”47 In a similar 
vein, the opinions of Justice Jeevan Reddy and Justice Ramaswamy 
similarly condemned the strategies of the Hindu Right as non-secular. 
For example, Justice Jeevan Reddy stated:  
[I]t is clear that if any party or organization seeks to 
fight the elections on the basis of a plank which has 
the proximate effect of eroding the secular philosophy 
of the Constitution it would certainly be guilty of 
following an unconstitutional course of action . . . . 
Introducing religion into politics is to introduce an 
impermissible element into body politic and an 
imbalance in our constitutional system. If a political 
party espousing a particular religion comes to power, 
that religion tends to become, in practice, the official 
 
3(A) of the same section…. [R]eligious tolerance and equal treatment of 
all religious groups and protection of their life and property and of the 
places of their worship are an essential part of secularism enshrined in our 
Constitution.  
Id. at 146–48. 
47. Id. at 149. Although each of the judges echoed the general idea of Indian 
secularism as the equal respect of all religions, there were slightly different 
emphases in each of their respective decisions. For example, while Justice Sawant 
most strongly emphasized the equal respect of all religions, and its requirement of 
toleration, Justice Jeevan Reddy’s decision placed some emphasis on the idea of the 
separation of religion and politics. After a long discussion of the requirement of 
equal respect, Justice Jeevan Reddy stated, “In short, in the affairs of the State . . . 
religion is irrelevant; it is strictly a personal affair. In this sense . . . our 
Constitution is broadly in agreement with the U.S. Constitution, the First 
Amendment whereof declares that ‘Congress shall make no laws respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .’ Perhaps this 
is an echo of the doctrine of separation of Church and State; maybe it is the modern 
political thought which seeks to separate religion from the State—it matters very 
little.” Id. at 235 (Jeevan Reddy, J.). By way of contrast again, Justice 
Ramaswamy’s opinion, while also speaking of the equal respect of all religions, 
included several references to the concept of neutrality. See, e.g., id. at 161–62 
(Ramaswamy, J.).  
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religion . . . . This would be plainly antithetical to 
Articles 14 to 16, 25 and the entire constitutional 
scheme adumbrated hereinabove. Under our 
Constitution, no party or organization can 
simultaneously be a political and a religious party.48 
 Justice Ramaswamy’s decision also strongly condemned the rise 
of fundamentalism as a violation of the constitutional principle of 
secularism. For example, he writes: “[The] rise of fundamentalism 
and communalization of politics are anti-secularism. They encourage 
separatist and divisive forces and become breeding grounds for 
national disintegration and fail the Parliamentary democratic system 
and the Constitution.”49 
In Bommai, the Indian Supreme Court lamented the destruction 
of the mosque. Not only was the act of vandalism described as a 
“national shame,” the Court expressed the view that the destruction of 
the mosque shook the faith of the minorities in justice and the 
constitutional process.50 The significance of Bommai lies in its 
recognition and reassertion of the importance of secularism in Indian 
constitutional law, as well as its restatement of the core ingredients 
that constitute the very specific “Indian” version of secularism: 
religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religions. It also 
underscored the right to freedom of religion as an integral component 
of secularism in India.  
Bommai represents a landmark moment in the Court’s protection 
of a specifically Indian model of secularism at a time when the 
country was experiencing the violent convulsions of communal 
politics. The Hindu Right’s majoritarian march towards establishing 
its understanding of secularism in Indian constitutional law, was 
temporarily thwarted by the extraordinary levels of death and 
destruction brought on by its public arguments and campaigns. The 
case suggested that the Court was committed to holding back the 
tides of intolerance and Hindu majoritarianism in the name of 
secularism.  
D.  Ismail Faruqui Case 
In the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in M. Ismail Faruqui v. 
Union of India (U.O.I.), there appears to be a substantial shift from its 
earlier position and reflects a discursive tension in the judicial 
 
48. Id. at 236 (Jeevan Reddy, J.). 
49. Id. at 175 (Ramaswamy, J.). 
50. Id. at 141 (Sawant, J.). 
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understandings of secularism. The case involved a constitutional 
challenge to the central government’s acquisition of the land at 
Ayodhya as well as the adjoining area following the destruction of 
the mosque.51 The acquisition was justified in the interests of 
maintaining public order and communal harmony in the wake of the 
demolition of the mosque.52   
The constitutional validity of the Acquisition of Certain Area at 
Ayodhya Act 1993 was challenged on the grounds that the 
acquisition was anti-secular as it interfered with the right to freedom 
of religion, in particular the right to worship, of the Muslim 
community.53 The land acquired included the site where the mosque 
once stood. The petitioner stated that the site continued to belong to 
the Muslims and a place where they could continue to perform their 
prayers or namaz. The petitioner stated that a mosque enjoyed a 
special position in Muslim law and that once it was established and 
prayers were offered in the mosque, it would remain the property of 
Allah for all time and that any person of the Islamic faith could offer 
prayers at such a place even if the structure had been demolished.54  
Alongside the constitutional challenge to the Act, a Presidential 
Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution was also made to the 
Court.55 The reference sought the Court’s opinion on “[w]hether a 
Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure” existed prior to the 
construction of the disputed structure.56 The reference provided stated 
that the request was being made in light of the fact that “a dispute has 
arisen whether a Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure 
existed prior to the construction of the structure (including the 
premises of the inner and outer courtyards of such structure, 
commonly known as the Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid) in the area 
in which the structure stood in village Kot Ramachandra in 
Ayodhya.”57 The Court was thus invited to consider an issue of faith 
and religion and in the process articulated the essential ingredients of 
the religion in a manner that also implicated the meaning of 
 
51. A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 605, 612 (India). 
52. Id. at 636. 
53. The acquisition was implemented through the enactment of the Acquisition 
of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993, which was the subject matter of the 
challenge. 
54. Id. at 640. 
55. Id. at 616. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 616–17.  
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secularism.  
The majority rejected the arguments that the Act in any way 
violated the constitutional principle of secularism. Speaking for the 
majority Justice Verma held that “the right to worship is not at any 
and every place, so long as it can be practiced effectively, unless the 
right to worship at the particular place is itself an integral part of that 
right.”58 Justice Verma went on to discuss the position in Muslim law 
stating firstly that “[u]nder Mohammedan law applicable in India, 
title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession,”59 and secondly 
that “[a] mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion 
of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, 
even in open [sic].”60 He concluded that the acquisition of the 
disputed areas as well as the surrounding land did not violate the 
religious freedom of Muslims and therefore, the acquisition was not 
prohibited under the Indian Constitution.61 While the majority 
recognized that the offering of prayer is a religious practice, it held 
that such an offering at all locations where such prayers can be 
offered was not an essential or integral part of the Muslim faith. Only 
if the place had a particular significance for the religion so as to 
constitute an essential or core practice could the interference be 
considered as in violation of the communities right to freedom of 
religion.  
At the same time the Court also entered into a discussion of the 
Hindu belief that the disputed site was the birthplace of Lord Ram 
and that therefore Hindus had the right to worship at the disputed site. 
In upholding the constitutional validity of Section 7(2) of the Act 
stating that the position existing prior to the destruction of the 
mosque should remain in place, the Court protected the worship of 
the idols planted on the site of the demolished mosque.62  
The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act but 
 
58. Id. at 641.  
59. Id. The doctrine of adverse possession permits a person who is in 
possession of land that is legally owned by someone else, to acquire valid title to it 
so long as the common law requirements are complied with and the adverse 
possessor has been in continuous possession of the land in question for a sufficient 
period of time as defined by law.  
60. Id.  
61. Id. at 644–45. 
62. Section 7(2) states, “[I]n managing the property vested in the Central 
Government, the Central Government or the authorised person shall ensure 
maintenance of the status quo in the area on which the structure (including the 
premises of the inner and outer courtyards of such structure), commonly known as 
the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid, stood.” Id. at 624–25.  
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declared Section 4(3) of the Act, which compulsorily abated the suits 
and legal proceedings pertaining to the disputed structure, to be 
invalid.63 The Court ordered the revival of all pending suits and legal 
proceedings before the Allahabad High Court to be heard on merits. 
It simultaneously declared the Presidential Reference as “superfluous 
and unnecessary” in view of the Court’s decision to uphold the 
validity of the Act.64 
In sharp contrast, the minority opinion in the case concluded that: 
When, therefore, adherents of the religion of the 
majority of Indian citizens make a claim upon and 
assail the place of worship of another religion and, by 
dint of numbers, create conditions that are conducive 
to public disorder, it is the constitutional obligation of 
the State to protect that place of worship and to 
preserve public order, using for the purpose such 
means and forces of law and order as are required. It is 
impermissible under the provisions of the Constitution 
for the State to acquire that place of worship to 
preserve public order. To condone the acquisition of a 
place of worship in such circumstances is to efface the 
principle of secularism from the Constitution.65 
The dissenting opinions delivered by Justice S.P. Bharucha on 
behalf of Justice A.M. Ahmadi and himself further observed that 
section 7(2) of the Act perpetuated the performance of the Hindu 
prayers or puja on the disputed cite: “No account is taken of the fact 
that the structure thereon had been destroyed in a most reprehensible 
act. The perpetrators of this deed struck not only against a place of 
worship but at the principles of secularism, democracy and the rule of 
law...”66 The decision did not take account of the fact there was a 
dispute with respect to the site on which the idols were placed and 
that the Muslim community continued to regard the mosque as 
legally belonging to them even after the idols were placed inside the 
mosque in 1949. 
 In the course of his discussion, Justice Verma quoted with 
approval a speech from the Indian President Shankar Dayal Sharma, 
 
63. Id. at 637. 
64. Id. at 641.  
65. Id. at 655–66 (Barucha, J. dissenting).  
66. Id. at 655 (internal quotations removed). 
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who defined secularism in India by drawing considerably on Hindu 
scriptures, and held that the principle of religious toleration found in 
Hindu scriptures was an integral feature of Indian secularism.67 The 
speech also drew from a more eclectic set of resources, including 
Islam, Christianity and Zorastrianism.68 However, towards the end of 
his decision, Justice Verma proceeded to observe that Hinduism is a 
tolerant faith that has enabled all of these religions to find shelter and 
support in India.69 While the discussion was intended to support the 
dominant model of secularism based on the equal treatment of all 
religions, the Court ended up interpreting this model along the lines 
of a Hindu majoritarian sensibility—holding for example that 
tolerance, a central component of Indian secularism, had its roots in 
Hinduism. The argument ends up aligning religious toleration with 
the Hindu faith and beliefs and subsuming other faiths within this 
logic. Implicit in this logic is that as Hindus are tolerant, and 
tolerance is a central component of Indian secularism, then only 
Hindus are truly secular.  
The Court also articulated the narrative of the demolition in 
terms that cast it as aberrational and an act of miscreants. Justice 
Verma stated: 
[T]he act of vandalism so perpetrated by the 
miscreants cannot be treated as an act of the entire 
Hindu community for the purpose of adjudging the 
constitutionality of the enactment. . . .The miscreants 
who demolished the mosque had no religion, caste or 
creed except the character of a criminal and the mere 
incident of birth of such a person in any particular 
community cannot attach the stigma of his crime to 
the community in which he was born.70   
Thus the Court reduced the demolition of the mosque that was 
driven by an ideological agenda to establish India as a Hindu state, to 
the acts of miscreants for which the entire Hindu community could 
not be held responsible.  
The case reinforced a normative conception of secularism 
together with the right to freedom of religion almost exclusively 
within majoritarian terms while simultaneously reducing the attack 
on Muslim religious sensibilities that was enacted through the 
 
67. Id. at 627–28 (Verma, J.). 
68. Id. at 628.  
69. Id. at 658.  
70. Id. at 634.  
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demolition of the mosque as entirely unrelated to religiosity and the 
pursuit of Hindu majoritarianism through liberal rights discourse. The 
injury caused to the Muslim religious minority community not only 
becomes unintelligible; the act is reduced to an act of destruction of 
property that in any case had little significance to the essential 
practices of the Muslim community. At the same time the religious 
sensibilities of the Hindu majority remain both understood and 
protected by ensuring that there would be no interference with the 
continued offering of their prayers at the disputed site.71  
E.   The Hindutva Cases 
The shift in the judicial approach to secularism was accentuated 
in the Supreme Court’s unanimous 1995 decisions in what came to be 
known as the Hindutva cases, the central case being Ramesh 
Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte.72 These cases 
involved a series of challenges to the election of several members of 
right wing parties to the state legislature on the grounds that they had 
appealed to religion in the course of their election campaigns and 
incited religious enmity and hatred, in violation of the provisions of 
the Representation of Peoples Act of 1951.73 A number of the 
campaign speeches appealed to the idea of Hindutva, arguing that the 
Muslim religious minorities in India were receiving special treatment 
under various provisions of the Constitution and in law. These 
provisions included separate personal status laws that governed 
familial and domestic concerns, as well as provisions that accorded 
the Muslim dominated state of Jammu and Kashmir special status 
under the Constitution.74  These were examples of the practice of 
appeasement and exceptional treatment that the candidates alleged 
 
71. In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court issued an order directing that no 
religious activity of any kind by anyone either symbolic or actual be allowed to 
take place on the 67 acres of land adjacent to the disputed site. It further clarified 
that even though no title rights were in dispute in the adjacent land, and that the 
order amounted to denying real property holders from worshipping on their own 
land, the restriction was necessary to ensure that (approvingly quoting from the 
Ismail Faruqui judgment) “the final outcome of the adjudication should not be 
rendered meaningless by the existence of properties belonging to Hindus in the 
vicinity of the disputed structure in case the Muslims are found entitled to the 
disputed site.” Mohd. Aslam, alias Bhure v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3413. 
72. A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1113 (India). 
73. The Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1951, INDIA CODE (1951), 
§ 123(3). 
74. See INDIA CONST. art. 370; The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce Act), No. 25 of 1986, INDIA CODE (1986).  
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were both intolerant and discriminatory.75 The difference in treatment 
of religious minorities was stated to be in violation of the 
Constitutional mandate of equal treatment of all religions, based on 
sameness in treatment, which was a central component of Indian 
secularism.76 The Court held that several candidates were guilty of 
appealing to religion to gain votes. At the same time, it also held that 
Hindutva—the ideological linchpin of the Hindu Right—simply 
represented “a way of life of people of the subcontinent” rather than 
an attitude hostile to persons practicing other religions or an appeal to 
religion.77 The Court held that, in fact, the speeches at issue appealed 
to the principle of secularism and to violations of the right to 
equality.78 According to the Court, election speeches that referred to 
religion during the course of the election campaigns with a secular 
stance that alleged discrimination against any religion and promising 
to remove that imbalance was consistent with secularism and outside 
the purview of section 123(3).79 As the speeches did not include an 
appeal to vote for or against a candidate on the basis of his religion it 
was not caught within the terms of the section.80 In other words, in 
criticizing the “pseudo-secularism” of their political opponents by 
pointing out the discrimination against Hindus that this version of 
secularism encouraged meant that the speech was of a secular 
nature.81 By validating the secular nature of the Hindu Right’s 
version of secularism, the Court allowed the Hindu Right’s version of 
secularism to officially enter into legal discourse.  
In arriving at its’ conclusions about Hindutva, the Court quoted 
extensively from two earlier decisions by the Constitutional Bench of 
the Supreme Court. The decision in Shastri Yagnapurushadji v. 
Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya82 included a lengthy discussion about the 
identities of Hindus and provided extensive commentary involving 
the definition of Hinduism to demonstrate that the Hindu religion 
“does not appear to satisfy the narrow traditional features of any 
religion or creed” and therefore it could be broadly described as a 
way of life.83 Similarly, in the Comm’r. of Wealth Tax, Madras v. 
 
75. Prabhoo v. Kunte, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1113, 1119–20 (India). 
76. Id. at 1123. 
77. Id. at 1127. 
78. Id. at 1131. 
79. Id. at 1132. 
80. Id.  
81. Id. 
82. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119 (India).  
83. Prabhoo, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. at 1127 (quoting Yagnapurushadji v. Vaishya, 
A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119). 
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Late R. Sridharan,84 Hinduism was described as  “doctrinally tolerant, 
leaving others-including both Hindus and non-Hindus- whatever 
creed and worship practices suit them best.“85 
  Relying on these two decisions, the Court in Prabhoo concluded 
that it could not give a precise meaning to the terms Hindu, 
Hinduism, or Hindutva:  
No meaning in the abstract can confine it to the 
narrow limits of religion alone, excluding the content 
of Indian culture and heritage. It is also indicated that 
the term Hindutva is related more to the way of life of 
the people in the sub-continent. It is difficult to 
appreciate how in the fact of these decisions the term 
“Hindutva” or “Hinduism” per se, in the abstract, can 
be . . . equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu 
religious bigotry, or [how it might] . . . fall with the 
prohibition of . . . Section 123 of the [Representation 
of the People Act].86  
In citing these two decisions to justify its’ holding that the 
Hindutva was a “way of life,” the Constitutional Bench in Prabhoo 
seemingly ignored the fact that neither decision mentioned the word 
“Hindutva.” In eliding its discussion of the meaning of Hinduism with 
the meaning of Hindutva, the Court ignored the historical and 
political context within which the concept of Hindtuva had acquired 
meaning that cannot be separated from its appeal to religion or from 
its assault on the legitimacy of religious minorities. 
The Supreme Court’s judgment was problematic in three 
respects. Firstly, the Court erred in concluding that Hindutva 
constituted a way of life of the people of the subcontinent, and that its 
deployment amounted to neither a violation of the prohibition on 
appealing to religion to gain votes nor a violation of the prohibition 
on promoting religious enmity and hatred. It failed to recognize that 
the term has historically had a specific meaning associated with the 
political philosophy of the Hindu Right, in particular its early 
ideologues V.D. Savarkar and M.S. Golwalkar.87 
 
84. (1976) 4 S.C.C. 478 (India). 
85. Prabhoo, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. at 1127. 
86. Id. at 1129. 
87. Anil Nauriya, The Hindutva Judgments: A Warning Signal, ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. Jan. 6, 1996, at 10, 11.   
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The Court’s discussion of Hinduism was also ubiquitous. It 
conflated the term “Hinduism” with “Indianess,” closing off any 
discussion on the possibility of non-Hindu forms of Indianess.88 The 
construction of a uniform Hindu culture instantiated an erasure of 
Muslim identity and religion. It constituted a majoritarian move 
where “Indianisation” was uncritically assumed to represent the 
cultural and political aspirations of all Indians, and the norms of the 
majority applied to all Indians, irrespective of their religious or 
cultural identity.89 The formulation that Hinduism as a “way of life” 
allows for an argument to be made that because it is so extant to the 
Indian way of life there is no distinction between “Indian culture” and 
Hinduism per se.90 Through this assimilation, Hinduism, the religion 
of the majority of Indians comes to reflect the way of life of all 
Indians.  
In accepting the secular nature of the speeches, the Court did not 
appreciate the broader discursive struggle over the meaning of 
secularism in India, in which the Hindu Right has been a very active 
player.91 The Hindu Right parties appropriated the dominant 
understanding of secularism as the equal respect for all religions to 
promote their vision of Hindutva and advance their agenda of 
establishing a Hindu state. Their emphasis on formal equal treatment 
of all religions on which Indian secularism is based operates as an 
unmodified majoritarianism whereby the majority Hindu community 
becomes the norm against which all others are to be judge and 
treated.   
In a subsequent petition filed in the Supreme Court to a larger 
bench of judges, seeking a review of the Hindutva judgment, the 
petitioner argued that the decision was inconsistent with the Court’s 
earlier ruling in the Bommai case.92 The review petition was rejected 
on technical grounds. However, in its order the Court observed that 
there was no inconsistency between the two decisions. In the Court’s 
 
88. Prabhoo, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. at 1129–30. 
89. Id. at 1130. 
90. See id. (discussing the contest over the meaning of Hinduism).  
91. See generally Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, By the Light of Reason: Corruption, 
Religious Speech, and Constitutional Essentials, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 
AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACIES 294 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000) (conducting a comparative 
study with U.S. cases and examining the justifications for constraining religious 
speech under the Representation of People Act as a constitutional essential but not 
interrogating the majoritarian instincts that inform the application of the regulation 
of free speech.). 
92. Mohammad Aslam v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1611 (India). 
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view, the Bommai case did not relate to the interpretation of the 
provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1951, and 
therefore there was nothing in the Bommai decision that was of 
assistance for constructing the meaning and scope of these 
provisions.93 At the same time, the Court sought to clarify its decision 
in the Hindutva cases, stating that it was simply based on earlier 
decisions of the Supreme Court that it was bound to follow and that 
in no way had it condoned the appeal to religion to gain votes in an 
election.94 The Court did not take up the opportunity to address a 
central contradiction in the Hindutva cases: the interpretation on the 
meaning of Hindutva and the secular nature of the speeches of the 
Hindu Right. The Courts conclusion in the Hindutva cases thus 
effectively vindicated the profoundly anti-secular vision of 
secularism that the Hindu Right has long been trying to promote and 
unwittingly left the door ajar for the Hindu Right to continue their 
discursive strategy in pursuing secularism for their distinctively anti-
secular ideological agenda. 
The Hindu Right hailed the decision in the Hindutva cases as a 
victory and continue to deploy the decision in its political advocacy 
not only as an endorsement of the “true meaning and content of 
Hindutva as being consistent with the true meaning and definition of 
secularism” but also to vindicate and validate its movement to begin 
the construction of the temple at Ayodhya.95 Their campaign to 
construct a Hindu temple where the Babri mosque once stood, by 
alleging that the mosque was built on the site of the birth of the 
Hindu god Ram, has generated broad-based support for the Hindu 
Right. Throughout the campaign some of their supporters have 
followed the marches to Ayodhya while other others have sent money 
and bricks to Ayodhya to help construct the new temple.96  The 
campaign, which eventually culminated in the destruction of the 
Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, was cast by the Hindu Right as a 
 
93. Id. at 1612. 
94. Id. 
95. BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY MANIFESTO 1998, available at 
http://bjpelectionmanifesto.com/pdf/manifesto1998.pdf. See BHARATIYA JANATA 
PARTY MANIFESTO 2009, available at 
http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf/election_manifesto_english.pdf (making no 
mention of the term “Hindutva” but referring to the true meaning of secularism 
within the framework of cultural nationalism).  
96. Cossman & Kapur, supra note 22, at 118.  
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legitimate expression of the sentiment of the majority.97 While the 
demolition of the mosque triggered massive communal riots around 
the country in which thousands were killed, the subsequent decision 
by the Allahabad High Court appears to have conferred some 
legitimacy on the destruction. 
II. THE AYODHYA CASE AND DETERMINING THE SPOT WHERE GOD 
WAS BORN 
A.   The Historical “Truth Claims” and Legal Narrative 
The Ayodhya case involves a dispute over the legal title to a 
property approximately 1500 square yards in size.98 Hindu parties 
claim that this particular spot is the janamsthan or birthplace of Ram, 
that they have a right of worship at the site, and that the title and 
possession of the site itself belongs to Hindu deities.99 While there 
are no less than four million gods and goddesses who live with 
Indians on the sidewalks, streets, and even travel with passengers in 
taxicabs, Ram has been accorded the status of übergod, especially in 
the discourse of the Hindu Right and those who have sought to 
consolidate the tradition under one god and one institution.100 This 
consolidation move is a thoroughly modern as well as Semitic move 
and has been enacted partly in and through the right to freedom of 
religion. Muslims have continued to assert that they have enjoyed 
exclusive legal title to the property ever since the Babri mosque was 
constructed in 1528.  
The assertion of the right to freedom of religion is advanced 
partly through the submission and reliance on a virtual mountain of 
historical documents and archaeological evidence. For example, the 
 
97. See Shri L.K. Advani, Statements on the Babri Masjid Demolition, BJP 
TODAY, Jan. 15, 1993, reprinted in THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, 
at 44–45 (defending those who pulled down the mosque as “exasperated by the 
tardiness of the judicial process, and the obtuseness and myopia of the executive”).  
98. Visharad v. Ahmad, O.O.S., No. 1 of 1989, All. H.C., 232 (2010) (Khan, 
J.). 
99.  Id. at 72–73, 77–78. 
100. As a number of historians have argued, the claim that Ram is the central 
Hindu deity runs counter to the polytheist character of Hinduism, transforming its 
pluralist character that accords well with a modernist and monotheist construction 
of religion. See Romila Thapar, Syndicated Moksha?, 313 SEMINAR 14, 15 (1985).  
See also Romila Thapar & Bipan Chandra, The Political Abuse of History, in 
BABRI MASJID/RAMA JANAMABHUMI DISPUTE 235 (Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., 
1987); Chetan Bhatt, Primordial Being: Enlightenment and the Indian Subject of 
Postcolonial Theory, in PHILOSOPHIES OF RACE AND ETHNICITY 40, 60–61 (Peter 
Osborne & Stella Sandford eds., 2002).  
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Hindu parities relied heavily on the Archaeological Survey of India’s 
findings produced through its court mandated excavations in 2003, 
which indicated that remnants of a twelfth century temple dedicated 
to Ram Lalla  (Infant Ram) existed and stood at the cite that marked 
the birthplace of Ram.101 The evidence is used to bolster the 
arguments made by some Hindu parties that in 1528 a temple was 
destroyed to build a mosque in its place. Other groups, such as the 
Nirmohi Akhara (Group without Attachment), used the historical 
material to claim that no mosque existed at the site and that the 
Akhara has been the sole custodian of it ever since the time of 
Ram.102 They partly relied upon a reference by Joseph Tiffenthaler, a 
European traveller who visited the town between 1766 and 1771, to 
the existence of a platform (referred to as the Ram Chabutra or Ram 
platform in later accounts) at the site.103 The significance of this 
reference rests in it being located at the site that Hindu parties 
subsequently claimed to be the birthplace of Lord Ram. Thus, while 
the historical and archaeological documentation was used by the 
Hindu parties primarily to demonstrate title and ownership of the 
disputed site, it was simultaneously also used to advance a claim to 
the sanctity and sacredness of the site for Hindus and that worship at 
the site represented a core and essential feature of the Hindu religion 
and its adherents. In contrast the Muslim parties used the historical 
material primarily to establish their legal title to the disputed site, 
rather than to assert their right to religious freedom.104 They claimed 
that Mir Baqi Isfahani, a general in the army of the Mughal Emperor 
Babur, constructed a mosque at the site in 1528 and that the title over 
it rested with the mosque ever since that time.105 
 
101. Sunni Central Waqf Board v. Gopal Singh Visharad, O.O.S. No. 4 of 
1989, All. H.C., Mar. 5, 2003, reprinted in THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra 
note 38, at 135–139.  
102. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C at 59 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 1). The Nirmohi 
Akhara was to become one of the main claimants in the Ayodhya legal dispute. 
They represent one of seven cloisters or akharas in Ayodhya, who worship Vishnu, 
and Ram as Vishnu’s avatar or incarnation. Hence the site is of particular relevance 
to Vaishnavite Hindus. See Hans Bakker, Ayodhya: A Hindu Jerusalem: An 
Investigation of “Holy War” as a Religious Idea in the Light of Communal Unrest 
in India, 38 NUMEN 80, 89–90 (1991) (stating that they view Ayodhya as sacred 
because Vishnu was born there and that Ram is Vishnu’s incarnation). 
103. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C at 20–23 (Sharma, J., Vol. 4).  
104. Id. at  29–30 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 1).  
105. Id.  
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The historical claims provide the backdrop to the legal contest 
that has been in existence since the latter part of the nineteenth 
century.106 In 1857, a series of skirmishes took place when Hindu 
ascetics occupied the alleged birthplace of Ram and the Muslims in 
the area retaliated.107 A compromise was reached whereby a partition 
was constructed on the disputed land in two equal parts.108 The inner 
portion or inner courtyard was allotted to the Muslims and the outer 
portion or outer courtyard was allotted to the Hindus.109 In 1885, 
Raghubar Das, the Hindu Mahant (head priest), sought permission 
from the district court to build a temple over the Ram Chabutra in the 
outer portion, that is, the land adjoining the Babri mosque.110 The suit 
was filed when some Hindu ascetics attempted to extend the 
boundary of the outer courtyard that would have also incorporated a 
Muslim cemetery that existed on the site.111 This case marks the first 
moment when the dispute was initiated into the legal arena. The 
Mutwalli (manager) of the Babri Mosque contested the suit claiming 
that the entire land belonged to the mosque.112 He argued that merely 
because Hindus had been allowed to pray in the mosque from time to 
time they could not acquire title over the property.  A map submitted 
to the court indicating the demarcation of the land into two equal 
parts was not however disputed.113 While the possession of the land 
by the Hindus was accepted, the suit was denied on public policy 
grounds that the construction of a temple would lead to the 
performance of noisy rituals including the blowing of conch shells, 
and since Muslims were praying nearby, their service would be 
disrupted. The court held that the construction would aggravate the 
already pervasive ill will and tension between the two 
communities.114  
 
106. See Parmanand Singh, The Legal History of the Ayodhya Litigation, in 
RAM JANMABHOOMI BABRI MASJID: HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, LEGAL 
OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS 29 (Vinay Chandra Mishra ed., 1991) (noting that a 
lawsuit was bought in 1885 regarding an attempt to construct a Ram Temple on the 
site of the Babri-Masjid).  
107. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 6 (Khan, J.). See THE BABRI MASJID 
QUESTION, supra note 38, at (173–175).  
108. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 6–7. 
109. Id. at 7.  
110. Id. at 9–12.  
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 16; THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 178–181. 
113. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 13–15, 17.  
114. See A.G. Noorani, Legal Aspects to the Issue in ANATOMY OF A 
CONFRONTATION: THE RISE OF COMMUNAL POLITICS IN INDIA 65 (Sarvepalli 
Gopal ed., 1991) (discussing the judge’s reason for declining to decree the suit).  
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A similar logic was adopted in subsequent court appeals. In the 
first appeal, Judge F.E.A. Chamier visited the disputed spot and 
admitted, “[i]t is most unfortunate that a Masjid should have been 
built on the land especially held sacred by the Hindus. But as that 
occurred 356 years ago, it is too late now to remedy the grievance. 
All that can be done is to maintain the parties in status quo.”115 A 
further appeal was also dismissed, with the Judge stating:  
This spot is situated within the precinct of the ground 
surrounding a mosque erected some 350 years ago 
owing to the bigotry and tyranny of the emperor who 
purposely chose this holy spot, according to Hindu 
legend, as the site of his mosque. The Hindus seem to 
have got very limited rights of access to certain spots 
within the precinct adjoining the mosque and they 
have for a series of years been persistently trying to 
increase those rights and to erect buildings on two 
spots in the enclosure namely: (1) Sita- ki-Rasoi 
(kitchen of Sita) and (2) Ram- Chander-ki-
Janmabhoomi (birthplace of Lord Ram). The 
executive authorities have persistently refused these 
encroachments and absolutely forbid any alteration of 
the status quo.116 
He further added that there was nothing on record to show that 
the plaintiff Raghubar Das was a proprietor of the land.117 The 
proceedings represented the first time when the disputed land was 
formally divided into a Hindu and a Muslim portion and also marks 
the emergence of the legal contest over the content of religious 
liberty. The modes of worship of the Hindus and Muslims would 
become a focus of judicial attention in the subsequent legal narrative 
of the case, with a persistent question remaining as to how these 
modes of worship and claims to property could be evaluated. The 
visit to the disputed site by the judges, as well as the recording of 
identifying marks and inscriptions on the monument, the routines of 
prayer and their timings, and the drawing up of procedures for 
regulating entry into the disputed site, were all used to construct the 
terms of the dispute and the content of the right to freedom of 
religion.  
 
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 66.  
117. Id.  
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In 1934, there were further riots between Hindus and Muslims at 
the disputed site, which caused severe damage to the mosque.118 The 
damage occurred when some sadhus (holy men) led by the Nirmohi 
Akhara forcefully occupied the mosque. Some of the Hindu parties 
claimed that the structure ceased to exist as a place of worship for 
Muslims from that time and as Hindus continued to hold their prayers 
at the disputed spot they could claim possession of the entire 
property.119 Muslim parties, in particular the Sunni Central Waqf 
Board, claimed that Muslims had continued to offer namaz (prayers) 
in the inner courtyard and remained in possession of the property.120 
In addition, in 1936, the board claimed that the mosque was waqf 
property and that the Sunni Board was its sole legatee.121  
In 1947, the City Magistrate of Faizabad ordered that the Ram 
Chabutra could not be converted into a permanent structure. Muslims 
were at the same time prohibited from re-building the damaged 
section of the mosque.122 The order further embedded the dispute 
within the legal process. In 1949, there were a series of further 
disturbances that culminated in some Hindu worshippers placing the 
idols from the outer area into the inner courtyard under the central 
dome of the mosque during the night of December 22, claiming the 
spot to be the exact birthplace of Ram.123 The court immediately 
issued a notice to attach the disputed property and handed temporary 
possession to a government appointed receiver.124 
A few days after the installation of the idols, K.K.K. Nayar, the 
District Magistrate of Faizabad in correspondence with the Chief 
Secretary of Uttar Pradesh, requested that the Hindus be given 
permission to erect a “decent and vishal (large) temple,” stating that 
 
118. See Parmanand Singh, Legal History of the Ayodhya Litigation, 18 
INDIAN BAR REV. 31 (1991), reprinted in THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra 
note 38, at 189 (noting that the riot was sparked by the slaughter of a cow during a 
Muslim festival).  
119. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C at 48–49 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 1).  
120. Id. at 21–22; Id. at 52 (Khan, J.).  
121. Id. at 30 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 1). Waqf means a “permanent dedication by a 
person professing Islam, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose 
recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable . . .” Wakf Act, No. 
43 of 1995, INDIA CODE (1993), available at http://indiacode.nic.in. Each waqf has 
a trustee and each mosque, a keeper or mutawalli. Id. Unlike a Hindu mahant, the 
mutawalli or manager has no propriety interest in the property nor is he allowed to 
derive any profit or financial gain from the property. Id. 
122. Order of City Magistrate, Faizabad (Apr. 28, 1947), reprinted in THE 
BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 202.  
123. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 23–24 (Khan, J.).  
124. Id. at 36–37. 
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the removal of the icons would amount to a “step of administrative 
bankruptcy and tyranny,” and produce immense suffering.125 Nayar 
mentions the slogans raised by the crowds demanding that he “open 
the doors of the lord.”126 Implicit in this request is that Hindus would 
be deeply affronted should the idols be removed and that such an act 
would be regarded as a violation of a deeply held belief that the site 
of the idols marked the spot where god was born. The state took 
possession of the mosque on January 5, 1950, and neither of the 
groups was allowed to worship at the site.127 However, while the 
enclosure where the idols were placed was fenced off, Hindu 
worshipers were permitted to worship from outside the fenced off 
area.128  Muslims were no longer able to offer any prayers inside the 
mosque.129  The Additional City Magistrate of Faizabad and Ayodhya 
also appointed a Hindu receiver to take care of the property until the 
court had determined the right to ownership.130 While the original 
division of the land into Hindu and Muslim sections was retained, the 
appointment of a Hindu receiver, together with the installation of the 
deities under the central dome of the mosque and the legal 
recognition of their installation represented a shift from the status quo 
towards an acknowledgement of the claim that the right to worship at 
the spot where the idols were installed was integral to the Hindu 
faith.  
The legalisation of the dispute through the local district courts 
continued between 1950 up until 1986. In 1950, a suit was filed 
claiming that the right to worship the idols was denied to Hindus by 
the order of receivership by Gopal Singh Visharad, a Hindu 
Mahasabha Member, and Parmahans Ramchandra Das, head of the 
Ram Janmabhomi Nyas (Ram Birthplace Trust).131 They claimed an 
 
125. Letter from Deputy Commissioner, Faizabad, to Chief Secretary, 
Government of Uttar Pradesh (Dec. 27, 1949), reprinted in THE BABRI MASJID 
QUESTION, supra note 38, at 215–18.  
126. Id. at 217. K.K.K. Nayar went on the contest the Utter Pradesh assembly 
elections in 1950 supported by Hindu organizations.  
127. S.K. Tripathi, Magistrate Markandey Singh’s Order under Section 145 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code 1898, INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 30, 1986, reprinted in 
THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 218; Noorani, supra note 114, at 
74–75.  
128. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 41 (Khan, J.).  
129. Id. at 40–41.  
130. Id. at 40; THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 218.  
131. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 42–44. The right was allegedly denied 
because of § 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which permitted a 
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unobstructed right to worship the idols at the place where the main 
dome of the mosque once stood.132 In 1959, the Nirmohi Akhara filed 
a suit against the court receiver and the state government of Uttar 
Pradesh claiming to be the religious order traditionally charged with 
the maintenance and management of the Ram Janamsthan.133 They 
claimed that a Hindu Temple dedicated to Ram Lalla (infant Ram) 
stood at the disputed spot ever since the twelfth century, marking his 
birthplace.134 In the alternative, they argued that Babur, the first 
Moghul emperor, had tried to unsuccessfully convert the temple into 
a mosque.135 Moreover, they argued that as Hindus had continued to 
pray and worship at the spot and no namaz (prayer) had been held 
inside the mosque since 1934, the Akhara was the sole owner of the 
Ram Janamsthan, as well as the temple and idol.136 In 1961, the 
Sunni Central Waqf Board filed a suit seeking a declaration that the 
disputed structure was a mosque and that possession of it be handed 
over to the Board.137 They stated that the structure was built on 
barren land or, in the alternative, on the ruins of a temple and that 
Muslims had been praying at the Babri Masjid since 1528, a practice 
that was halted after the idols were installed.138 They claimed that 
they had exclusive possession of the premises though Hindus had 
prayed in the outer courtyard.139 The four suits were consolidated 
with the suit of the Sunni Waqf Board being treated as the leading 
case.140 
The last suit was filed in 1980 on behalf of the idol, Ram Lalla, 
and the Ram Janamsthan, with the petitioner claiming that both were 
juristic entities, as deities were legally capable of holding land in 
 
magistrate to order that the devotees could only practice worship from behind the 
railing that had been installed.  
132. Id. at 44.  
133. Id. See Nirmohi Akhara v. Baboo Priya Datt Ram, O.O.S., No. 3 of 1989, 
All. H.C. (India). 
134.  While the Archeological of India (ASI) came to the ambiguous 
conclusion that its excavations revealed the existence of remnants of a temple-like 
structure in the place where the mosque was constructed, these findings remained 
disputed throughout the course of the proceedings by the Sunni Central Wakf 
Board as well as various academics. See Supriya Varma & Jaya Menon, Was There 
a Temple under the Babri Masjid? Reading the Archaeological “Evidence,” ECO. 
& POL. WKLY., Nov. 11, 2010, at 61, 61–71 (2010).  
135. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 32 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 1).  
136. Id. at 47–49 (Khan, J.).  
137. Id. at 50–51, 58–59 (citing Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, U.P v. Gopal 
Singh Visharad, O.O.S., No. 4 of 1989, All. H.C. (India)).  
138. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 1 (Sharma, J., No. 2, Vol. 1).  
139. Id. at 55–56 (Khan, J.). 
140. Id. at 78–79.  
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their own name and of suing and being sued.141 They acquired a legal 
personality with the attributes of real individuals, backed by 
administrative doctrines.142 The petitioner filed the suit as “a friend” 
of the idol, seeking title and possession of the disputed property 
solely in favour of Ram. The petitioner was a member of the VHP, 
established in the mid-1960s to popularize the message of the Hindu 
Right.143 The relevance of this suit lay partly in the fact that the VHP 
did not trust the Nirmohi Akhara, whose interest seemed to be in 
asserting a religious claim and not with the broader political agenda 
of the VHP. This suit was filed at a time when the political climate in 
India had changed considerably as a mass based agitation had been 
launched for the construction of the temple spearheaded by the BJP 
and led by its former head L.K. Advani.144  
 
141. Id. at 69–70. A deity has the identity of a juridical entity, who can be both 
sued and also sue. The deity can be represented by a qualified person, who is 
known as the Shebait/Dharmakarta, and whose responsibility it is to protect the 
idol’s property. The origin of the notion that idols are juristic persons in law seems 
to be based in Roman law, where a similar concept operated with respect to 
churches. See FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 481 (1895) (“Perhaps 
the oldest of all juristic persons is the god, hero or the saint.”). However, over the 
years, the notion of a juristic person for the idol has been developed by Indian 
courts as one based on the religious customs of the Hindus themselves. See, e.g., 
Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, (1925) 52 I.A. 245 (India) 
(stating that a Hindu idol has the power to sue and be sued); Kalanka Devi 
Sansthan v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribal, Nagpuri, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 439, 441 
(India) (“[W]hen property is given absolutely for the worship of an idol it vests in 
the idol itself as a juristic person.”).  
142. Hindu religious idols and images are considered animate and capable of 
making economic, political, and legal claims. See J. DUNCAN M. DERRETT, 
RELIGION, LAW AND THE STATE IN INDIA 484–85 (1968) (discussing the legal 
personality of Hindu idols).  
143. See generally MANJARI KATJU, VISHVA HINDU PARISHAD AND INDIAN 
POLITICS (2003) (providing a detailed discussion on the role of the VHP in Indian 
politics).  
144. L.K. Advani was the leader of the opposition BJP in September 1990. He 
launched a rath yatra (journey of the charioteer) across a number of states in India 
to garner support for the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya.  See Pinarayi: 
Sudheeran’s Remarks a Challenge to Secularism, HINDU (March 19, 2014), 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-kerala/pinarayi-sudheerans-
remarks-a-challenge-to-secularism/article5803249.ece (stating that Advani, along 
with former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee that created “communal agitation all 
over the country for constructing a Ram temple in Ayodhya”).   
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From the mid-1980s, the Hindu parties stepped up their rhetoric 
and sought court sanction over the performance of specific rituals at 
the site. These interventions coincided with the rise of the Hindu 
Right as a powerful political force in contemporary Indian politics. 
Some of these interventions included a suit seeking the removal of 
the locks that had been placed on the fenced off portion.145 In 1986, 
the local district Judge directed that the locks of the mosque be 
opened, without hearing the application for impleadment made by 
interested Muslim parties as well as the Waqf board. The Judge urged 
the Muslims to recognize the fact that the idols and site were juristic 
entities and had a legal personality, and that they should permit 
Hindu worshippers to access the site. He stated that the Muslims 
would not be affected in any manner if the locks of the gates were to 
be opened and pilgrims and devotees allowed inside the premise to 
worship. The court added: 
It is undisputed that the premises are presently in the 
court’s possession and that for the last 35 years Hindus 
have had an unrestricted right of worship as a result of 
the court’s order of 1950 and 1951. If the Hindus are 
offering prayers and worshipping the idols, though in 
a restricted way for the last 35 years, then the heavens 
are not going to fall if the locks of the gates are 
removed.146  
In the process of delivering its order, the court initiated a process 
of universalizing the practice of worshipping at the site as an 
essential practice and an experience and belief of all Hindus. The 
locks were broken open within half an hour of the pronouncement of 
the order.147 
Thereafter, in 1989, the VHP, one of the parties to the Ayodhya 
dispute, conducted an event consecrating the bricks to be used for the 
construction of the temple and invited villagers and communities 
around the country to make bricks for the temple that would be 
transported to the site.148 The Allahabad High Court refused a request 
for an injunction against the consecration and transportation of the 
bricks, while it also directed that the status quo over the disputed site 
 
145. Umesh Chandra Mishra Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1991 L.L.R. 
638 (India) reprinted in THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 267–69.  
146. NOORANI, supra note 114, at 79. 
147. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 88 (Khan, J.). Mohammad Hashim filed a 
write petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the order. See THE BABRI 
MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 270.  
148. DIANE P. MINES, FIERCE GODS 203 (2005).  
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be maintained.149 Hundreds of thousands of bricks poured into 
Ayodhya and in October 1990 several workers belonging to the 
Hindu Right parties stormed the mosque and placed three saffron 
flags on the domes of the mosque, damaging them in the process.150 
The process of acquisition and legitimation of their claim to worship 
at the exact spot where the idols were lodged had acquired a 
significant momentum and was gradually being consolidated. 
The Uttar Pradesh state government also helped in the 
consolidation move by acquiring almost three acres of land including 
the cemetery and outer portion of the mosque, ostensibly to provide 
facilities for the pilgrims visiting the site and to accommodate 
tourism.151 This move  was challenged on the grounds that the land 
was waqf property and hence could not be acquired by the state 
government.152 The petition further alleged that the acquisition was 
motivated by a bigger design to ensure the construction of a 
temple.153 While the court issued an interim order upholding the 
acquisition of the land, it also held that the possession would be 
subject to further orders and that the land could not be alienated or 
transferred.154  
On December 6, 1992 the mosque was demolished by Hindu 
karsevaks (volunteers), after the BJP and other members of the Hindu 
 
149. See Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, U.P v. Gopal Singh Visharad, O.O.S., 
No. 4 of 1989, All. H.C. (India). 
150. THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 331–33; Krishna 
Pokharel & Paul Beckett, Ayodhya, the Battle for India’s Soul: Chapter Four, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/12/06/ayodhya-the-battle-for-indias-soul-
chapter-four/; Mark Tully, Ayodhya Showed that Mixing Religion and Politics is 
Playing with Fire, INDIA TODAY (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/mark-tully-ayodhya-babri-masjiddemolition/1/23 
6638.html.  
151. Uttar Pradesh State Gov’t Notification No. 3814/XLI-33-86, dated Oct. 7, 
1991, reprinted in THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 334–36.  
152. Mohd. Hashim v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Order on Writ Petition 3540 
(M/B) of 1991, reprinted in THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 337.  
153. Id. (the notification said the purpose of the acquisition was for developing 
tourism and providing amenities to pilgrims).   
154. In a separate writ filed by the Sakshi Gopal Temple ensuring that the 
acquisition would not affect the religious character of the site, the court held that 
the acquisition would be subject to the caveat that the deity in the temple would be 
preserved and that no permanent structure would be constructed at the site. Shakshi 
Gopal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Writ Petition No. 3579 (HB) of 1991, reprinted in 
THE BABRI MASJID QUESTION, supra note 38, at 344.  
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Right organized a religious prayer ceremony that was to mark the 
symbolic construction of the temple.155 The destruction of the 
mosque was partly facilitated by the history of the legal dispute that 
preceded it, where the courts invariably decided in favour of the 
Hindu parties, together with the ideological zeal of the Hindu Right, 
which remained determined to establish the site as integral to the 
Hindu faith and identity.  
As discussed earlier, the government subsequently issued an 
ordinance to acquire the disputed site and adjacent lands following 
the destruction of the mosque, and a constitutional challenge to the 
act was dismissed. The Court however invalidated section 4(3), 
which provided for the abatement of all pending suits and legal 
proceedings pertaining to the disputed structure.156 In light of this 
decision, in 1995, a three-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court 
re-commenced proceedings to hear the arguments in the dispute and 
delivered its decision on September 30, 2010.  
B.   The Judicial Holdings 
On September 30, 2010, the decision in the Ayodhya land-
holding case was delivered by a three-member bench of the 
Allahabad High Court, located in India’s western state of Uttar 
Pradesh, amidst tight security.157 The three judges included:  Justice 
Khan, a Muslim; Justice Agarwal, who delivered the majority 
opinion; and Justice Sharma, who was the dissenting judge in the 
case. The decision ran into a staggering 8,189 pages, the longest 
being 5,238 pages and delivered by Justice Agarwal. While there was 
no outbreak of public violence after the decision was pronounced, 
appeals were filed by all sides in the Supreme Court, reflecting 
considerable dissatisfaction over the ruling. 
On the specific issue of the right to freedom of religion, the 
“Muslim” parties did not advance any arguments based on the 
freedom of religion clauses. And Justice Khan was the only one of the 
three judges who did not address the arguments made in relation to 
 
155. Id. at 254. Dilip Awasthi, Babri Masjid Demolition - 1992: A Look at the 
Countdown to Disaster, INDIA TODAY (Dec. 5, 2011), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/st 
ory/babri-masjid-demolition-1992-ayodhya-shame/1/162900.html.  
156. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 S.C.C. 360, 383 (India). 
157. Several companies of the Central Security Paramilitary forces as well as 
the police were deployed across the state and through different parts of the country, 
and special security was provided to the three judges who rendered the decision in 
the title disputes. Tight Security Across the Country amid Appeals for Peace, 
HINDU (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tight-security-
across-the-country-amid-appeals-for-peace/article804415.ece.  
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Articles 25 and 26, but focused exclusively on the issue of title.158 
Justice Khan held that neither party was able to demonstrate 
exclusive title to the disputed property.159 The available evidence 
indicated that by the middle of the eighteenth century there existed a 
mosque at the site and that by the middle of the nineteenth century 
Hindus were claiming that this site was the birthplace of Ram.160 
Since 1855, both parties appeared to be in joint possession of the 
site.161 Justice Khan decided to divide the disputed property into three 
equal parts: one part was awarded to the Muslim parties; one part was 
given to the Hindu Idols, with the caveat that their part should 
include the land under the central dome; and one part was handed 
over to the Nirmohi Akhara with the caveat that their part should 
include the outer courtyard.162 Justice Khan based his decision on the 
issue of title and possession, rather than on considerations of the right 
to freedom of religion, although he recognised the significance of the 
site for Hindus.163   
Justice Khan’s decision to divide the property into three parts is 
curious and there is no real explanation for altering the situation from 
1949 when the property was divided into two nearly equal parts 
between the Hindu and Muslim communities. In permitting the area 
under the central dome to be given over to the idols, the judge’s 
decision is contrary to the acknowledged fact that the idols had been 
placed there illegally and only in 1949. Justice Khan’s decision placed 
the onus on the Muslim community to make all the necessary 
adjustments in relation to the dispute.164 
 Justice Agarwal accepted that there was a non-Islamic, ancient 
structure that stood where the mosque once stood.165 While the earlier 
 
158. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 250–55 (Khan, J.) (addressing the issue of 
title); id. at 4997–98, 5043–44 (Agarwal, J.) (discussing protections under Articles 
25 and 26); id. at 166 (Sharma, J.) (noting the differences in protection provided by 
Articles 25 and 26).  
159. Id. at 255, 283 (Khan, J.). 
160. Id. at 206, 281, 283.  
161. Id. at 250, 260.  
162. Id. at 275–76, 284–85.  
163. Id. at 243–44, 250–56.  
164. See id. at 279–80 (“Indian Muslims … are therefore in the best position to 
tell the world the correct position. Let them start with their role in the resolution of 
the conflict at hand.”). 
165. Id. at 4414–15 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 18); see also ALIGARH HISTORIANS 
SOCIETY, HISTORY AND THE JUDGEMENT OF THE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT, 
(LUCKNOW BENCH) IN THE RAMJANMABHUMI–BABRI MASJID CASE iii–iv (2010) 
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structure appeared to be a Hindu religious place, the ruins could also 
be evidence of other non-Islamic traditions or practices.166 He also 
accepted that there was evidence of persistent practice as well as a 
strong belief on the part of Hindus that the disputed spot, particularly 
the spot under the central dome, was the birthplace of Ram.167 This 
faith was borne out by ancient literature that Justice Agarwal stated 
should be “accepted on its face without any ‘tinkering.’”168 He thus 
implied that such persistent practice and faith was enough to deify the 
place and give it a juridical personality.  
Justice Agarwal addressed the issue of whether a deity has a 
right to file a suit, a right that was contingent on whether the idol had 
been properly consecrated and hence acquired a juristic personality. 
The Judge observed that a determination whether the idol had been 
properly consecrated could only be made according to the doctrine 
and belief of the respective religious denomination.169 In considering 
this issue, Justice Agarwal involved himself in the construction of 
Hindu tradition and belief. The Hindu parties contended that the 
entire site would be regarded as a temple and have a juristic 
personality.170 During the course of the proceedings, Justice Agarwal 
asked the Hindu parities whether the worship of rivers and hills by 
Hindus, would render all such places juristic persons?171 In response, 
the defendants stated: 
[I]t is the belief of the Hindu people that the fort of 
King Dashrath situated at Ayodhya included the part 
of the building wherein Lord Rama was born 
according to Hindu belief and the disputed area 
covered that house. It is believed that it is this place 
which is so pious and sacred for Hindu people being 
the birthplace of Lord Rama and, therefore, in this 
particular case, it is not necessary to go into larger 
question since it is not the claim of the Hindu parties 
that the entire city of Ayodhya or the entire locality is 
birthplace of Lord Rama. He was born at Ayodhya is a 
well-known fact. In Ayodhya, it is the disputed place 
 
(discussing Judge Agarwal’s judgment and how his reasoning and understandings 
of the dispute are historically flawed). 
166. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 4414–15. 
167. Id. at 4436. 
168. Id. at 3502. 
169. Id. at 2173.  
170. Id. at 1807, 1831, 1975 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 8). 
171. Id. at 1974–75. 
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where the Lord of Lords was manifested in the form of 
natural person and, therefore, it is believed to be the 
birthplace of Lord Rama by Hindus for time 
immemorial and they visit it to worship and Darshan. 
This satisfy [sic] the requirement of a ‘deity.’ He 
submits that ‘deity’ in the name of birthplace of Lord 
Rama is a legal person considering the concept of 
legal personality of Hindu deity…172 
The Judge accepted this argument (while construing the spiritual 
nature of Hinduism) and held that “[i]f the public goes for worship 
considering that there is a divine presence and offer worship thereat 
believing that they are likely to be the recipient of the bounty of God 
then it satisfies the test of a temple. Installation of an idol or the mode 
of worship are not the relevant and conclusive test.”173 Justice 
Agarwal also held that the deity was a perpetual minor and therefore 
no claim of adverse possession could be made against the deity.174 
For the same reason the suit on behalf of the Lord Ram filed in 1989 
was not time-barred and a next of friend was entitled to represent the 
deity.  
Various Indian courts have recognised a temple deity as a legal 
entity and that even a devotee or a regular worshipper can move the 
court on behalf of the presiding deity.175 Justice Agarwal’s holding 
could have serious implications with regards to claims being made all 
over India in relation to Islamic structures and historical monuments. 
He also cited the right to freedom of religion and the view that the 
right to worship at the birthplace of Ram constituted a core ingredient 
 
172. Id. at 1975. 
173. Id. at 1977. 
174. Id. at 2031–33. 
175. Id. at 2034. There have been several cases recognizing that all deities are 
perpetual minors, not only child deities such as Lord Ram. As a result the courts 
have held that no suit filed on their behalf can be treated as time-barred. Sri Adi 
Visheshwara v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1997 (4) S.C. 124 (where the Court ruled 
that a deity could move the court and that the properties of endowment vested in 
the deity). Several scholars have disputed the equation of idols with minors. See, 
e.g., Gautam Patel, Idols in Law, ECO. & POL. WKLY 49 (2010); Debaashish 
Bhattacharya, God of Small Things, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 7, 2010), 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1101107/jsp/7days/story_13147783.jsp; J. 
Venkatesan, Suits on Behalf of Deities Can’t be Treated as Time-Barred, HINDU 
(Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/suits-on-behalf-
of-deities-cant-be-treated-as-timebarred/article810107.ece. 
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of the Hindu faith.176 To allow a claim of adverse possession would 
extinguish a core feature of the religion and hence the religion itself, 
and would be contrary to the fundamental right of freedom of religion 
protected under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. He further 
stated that while the state could acquire any property that belonged to 
a particular religious group for public purpose, it was refrained from 
doing so if the property was of “special significance” to the 
community.177 Such state intervention would violate Article 26 that 
protected the essential features of a religion. Justice Agarwal thus 
held that, “Undoubtedly, Asthan Ram Janma Bhumi . . . belongs to 
this very category of Deity – Class entirely by itself; hence the State 
cannot acquire either the Deity or its property.”178  
Justice Agarwal also held that the statute of limitation, which 
bars a suit from being filed after a specific period of time has passed 
(usually three years from the date of the initial wrong or violation), 
would not apply in this case as it would violate the fundamental 
rights of the Hindus to worship at the site.179 Justice Agarwal stated: 
It is a deity, which has filed the present suit for 
enforcement of its rights. The religious endowment in 
the case in hand so far as Hindus are concerned, as 
they have pleaded in general, is a place of a peculiar 
and unique significance for them and there cannot be 
any other place like this. In case this place is allowed 
to extinguish/extinct [sic] by application of a provision 
of statutes, may be of limitation or otherwise, the 
fundamental right of practicing religion shall stand 
denied to the Hindus permanently since the very 
endowment or the place of religion will disappear for 
all times to come and this kind of place cannot be 
created elsewhere.180  
Justice Agarwal further stated that a similar argument could have 
been available to the Muslim parties had they been able to show that 
that the mosque was of special significance to them:  
In fact this reason could have been available to the 
plaintiffs (Suit-4) also had it been shown by them that 
the mosque in question for them was a place of special 
 
176. Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. at 2617 (Agarwal, J..Vol. 12). 
177. Id. at 2551–2552 (Vol. 11), 2615–17 (Vol. 12).  
178. Id. at 2552 (Vol. 11).  
179. Id. at 2611–15. 
180. Id. at 2615. 
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significance but this has already been observed by the 
Apex Court in respect to this particular mosque that 
like others it is one of the several mosques and by 
acquisition of the place it will not have the effect of 
depriving such fundamental right of Muslims. It is 
always open to them to offer prayer at any other place 
like they could have done here but Hindus are not 
placed on similar footing. According to Hindus, this is 
a place of birth of lord Rama and that be so, there 
cannot be any other place for which such belief 
persists since time immemorial. Once this land is 
allowed to be lost due to the acts of persons other than 
Hindus, the very right of this section of people, as 
protected by Article 25, shall stand destroyed.181  
Referring to the Supreme Court decision in Ismail Faruqui 
discussed earlier in this article, Justice Agarwal further stated: 
A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the 
religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can 
be offered anywhere even in open. . . . [U]nless the 
right to worship at a particular place is itself an 
integral part of that right, i.e., the place is of a 
particular significance, its alienability cannot be 
doubted.182  
 Implicit in Justice Agarwal’s reasoning is that the offering of 
namaz by Muslims is not as significant to their religion as is worship 
at the birthplace of Ram for Hindus. The holding suggests that the 
individual right to worship is an inferior right to the Hindu’s 
collective right to worship at the site where god was ostensibly born. 
The decision suggests that the Muslim’s individual right to worship is 
an inferior right to the Hindu’s collective right to worship at the site 
where god was ostensibly born. Justice Agarwal’s reasoning reflects 
that what is at stake is nothing less than the epistemological basis and 
competing truth claims of different religious traditions. 
 Justice Agarwal proceeded to articulate how the fundamental 
right to freedom of religion gets established and protected. He stated 
that: 
 
181. Id. at 2617.  
182. Id. at 4412 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 18).  
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It may be noticed at this stage the scope of judicial 
review about what constitute religious belief or what 
[are] essential religious practices or what rites and 
ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of a 
particular religion. It is not the subject to the belief or 
faith of a judge but once it is found that a belief, faith, 
rite or ceremony is genuinely and consciously treated 
to be part of the profession or practice of a religion by 
the segment of people of distinct group, believing in 
that particular religion, suffice it to constitute 
‘religion’ within the term of Article 25 of the 
Constitution whereunder the persons of the said 
segment have a fundamental right to practice their 
religion without any interruption from the State. This 
right is subject only to public order, morality and 
health and to the other provisions of Part III of the 
Constitution as well as the power of the State to make 
laws in respect to the matter provided in Article 25(2) 
of the Constitution. This right is conferred to the 
persons professing, practising and propagating the 
concerned religion.183 
He further added: 
[O]nce such belief gets concentrated to a particular 
point, and in totality of the facts, we also find no 
reason otherwise, it partakes the nature of an essential 
part of religion particularly when it relates to a matter 
which is of peculiar significance to a religion. It, 
therefore, stands on a different footing. Such an 
essential part of religion is constitutionally protected 
under Article 25.184  
Having held that the Hindu parties had established their 
fundamental right to worship at the site on the grounds that it was an 
essential feature of their faith, Justice Agarwal addressed the other 
arguments of the Muslim parties. He proceeded to hold that the 
Muslim parties had not proved that Babur had title over the land nor 
had they successfully challenged the argument that the construction 
of the mosque failed to adhere to the principles of Islam. Hence, he 
declared that the structure was not a legitimate mosque and that it 
was non-existent. He held that the area under the dome had to be 
 
183. Id. at 1036–37 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 5).  
184. Id. at 4997–98 (Agarwal, J., Vol. 20).  
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given to the idols, the inner courtyard to be shared between Hindus 
and Muslims and the outer courtyard to be shared between the idols 
and Nirmohi Akhara.185 However, he also stated that the Muslim 
parties should be given at least a third of what the other parties were 
being given, and requested the government to ensure land was made 
available for such a purpose.186 This last move was more of an act of 
Solomonic justice, rather than based on the facts and legal questions 
raised in relation to possession and title.187  
In his dissenting opinion set out in 2,666 pages, Justice Sharma 
held that the disputed site had long been believed to be the birthplace 
of the “Lord of the Universe”—Shri Ram.188 He explicitly treats the 
dispute as not between private parties but between religious 
communities, stating that “the present suit is a representative suit and 
plaintiffs are representing the interest of Muslims and defendants 
have been arrayed representing the interest of Hindus.”189 He further 
stated that the “the dominant issue in the present dispute pertains to 
the legal adjudication of matters relating to the Hindu faith.”190 In this 
regard, he noted, approvingly quoting from B.K. Mukherji’s The 
Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, that the Court was 
obliged to “act upon the belief of the members of the community 
concerned, and unless these beliefs are per se immoral or opposed to 
public policy, it cannot exclude those who profess any lawful creed 
from the benefit of charitable gifts...”191 Justice Sharma also placed 
considerable reliance on the historical documentation. In this regard, 
he pointed out that the Court had decided to take the assistance of 
archeological “science,” since according to him, archeology would 
deliver accurate answers to the dispute.192 On the basis of the 
 
185. Id. at 5077. 
186. Id. at 5077–78. 
187. Implicit in Justice Agarwal position is that while the disputed site was 
sacred to Hindus and that worship there was an essential practice of the Hindu 
faith, the Muslims should not feel that they were being deprived of all rights. Given 
that a mosque had been destroyed, some level of compensation needed to be 
provided to the Muslim groups to assuage the sense of injustice they were 
experiencing, but it would not be at the cost of the Hindu right to worship precisely 
at the spot where the mosque once stood.  
188. Id. at 192 (Sharma, J., Vol. 1). 
189. Id. at 206. Notably, the Muslims did not contest this position. 
190. Id. at 28 (Vol. 4). 
191. Id. at 29–30. 
192. Id. at 28. (“It is not a matter of dispute now that in the modern age 
Archaeological Science has achieved the great accuracy. Thus with the assistance 
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Archaeological Survey of India report that there existed a temple 
before the mosque and parts of the temple were used in the 
construction of the mosque, Justice Sharma concluded that a Ram 
Janambhoomi temple was destroyed in order to construct the 
mosque.193 Relying on excerpts from the report and statements made 
by the various officials working under the ASI, Justice Sharma, 
showed how the various artifacts discovered during the ASI 
excavation of the site, left “no doubt” that the structure was a 
temple.194 He treated the report and statements of ASI officials as 
expert evidence and also held that there was no evidence that the 
report was biased, but was “scientific.” 195 
Based on his broad reading of Article 25, and tenets of Hindu 
faith, Justice Sharma held that:  
[E]ach and every thing connected with the Lord of 
Universe is of great value to the Hindus and extinction 
of the most holiest shrine Sri Ramajanamsthan will 
deprive the Hindus from acquiring unparallel merit 
and salvation which can be obtained only by visiting 
the said sacred shrine and performing customary ritual 
there.196  
. . .  
[A]s the Suit premises is the Birth Place of the Lord of 
Universe Sri Rama and his invisible power is present 
in the said Sthandil [sic. a piece of open ground] the 
Hindus have superior fundamental right to worship at 
that sacred place according to injunctions of their 
Sacred Scriptures in comparison to the fundamental 
 
of Archaeological Science, one can answer up to the considerable degree of 
certainty about various past activities of people for which material evidence is 
available.”). 
193. Id. at 160–61. 
194. Id. at 80. 
195. Id. at 94 (“The main thrust of the plaintiffs is that there was a structure 
which was not a Hindu religious structure is not believable for the reasons that 
certain images were found on the spot were there. Hundreds of artifacts which find 
mention in the report were recovered during the excavation that denote the 
existence of Hindu religious structure.”); Id. at 96 (“The Court is taking full care 
and issued specific directions to maintain transparency. . . . The excavation was 
conducted in presence of the parties, lawyers and their nominees. Thus, no body 
can raise a finger about the propriety of the report on the ground of bias. There is 
nothing on record to suggest that the scientific report is incorrect.”).  
196. Id. at 203 (Sharma, J., Vol. 4). . 
350 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:305 
 
 
right of the Muslims to offer their prayer at that place 
which in not integral part of Muslim religion.197  
Finding that there was adequate proof the disputed area was the 
birthplace of Ram, and as the birthplace of Ram itself was a deity for 
purposes of holding property, Justice Sharma held that the property 
belonged to the deity itself.198 Like Justice Agarwal, he also found 
that for the purposes of limitation a deity was a perpetual minor and 
thus its land could never be taken away by adverse possession.199 
Therefore, the title of the land never passed either by conquest or by 
adverse possession. 
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Sharma held that to dispossess 
Hindus from the land would be to extinguish a core ingredient of the 
Hindu religion, which is the birthplace of Ram. He states, “Lord Ram 
as the Avatar (Reincarnation) of Vishnu, having been born at Ayodhya 
at the Janmasthan is admittedly the core part of Hindu belief and faith 
which is in existence and practiced for the law thousands of years.”200  
In his decision, Justice Sharma adopts an expansive definition of 
religion, which is not in his view only confined to opinion, doctrine 
or belief, but also includes religious practices.201 As the Constitution 
did not set out a definition of religion, it included any act “in 
pursuance of religious belief as part of religion.”202  He added that no 
secular authority of the State could restrict or prohibit such essential 
practices or extinguish the same through a suit or by transfer to 
another party. 203  In the process of declaring that the right to worship 
at the disputed site was a core ingredient of the Hindu faith, Justice 
Sharma essentialized and ossified the Hindu tradition against any 
notions of plurality, diversity or fluidity.  
While the right to worship is an important component of 
freedom of religion, both Justice Agarwal and Justice Sharma held 
that the right to worship on the exact spot where god was born was a 
core or essential ingredient of the Hindu faith and part of the 
 
197. Id. at 215. 
198. Id. at 182. 
199. Id. at 167; Id. at 2031–33 (Agarwal, J.) (determining that the a deity is a 
perpetual minor for purposes of adverse possession). 
200. Id. at 121. 
201. Id. at 126 (“Religious practices are as much part of religion as faith or 
belief in actual doctrine.”). 
202. Id. at 128.  
203. Id. at 128–29. 
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collective belief of the community.204 In the process they not only 
rejected the plurality of tradition within the Hindu faith, they centred 
one particular position. Hindus and scholars alike have contested the 
position taken by the two judges, who considered worship at the site 
a core ingredient.205 The fact that large tracts of Hindus do not 
worship Ram nor even recognize him as a noted deity challenges the 
claim that worship at his ostensible birthplace is a core ingredient of 
the Hindu tradition.  
While the Ayodhya decision has been stayed by the Supreme 
Court on grounds that partition of the property was not a relief 
claimed by any of the parties, the broader discursive struggle over the 
meaning of freedom of religion and the Hindu Right’s pursuit of a 
more robust understanding of this concept have implications for the 
meaning of secularism in Indian Constitutional law well beyond the 
decision.   
III. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION: CONSTRUCTING HINDU 
MAJORITARIANISM THROUGH SECULAR LAW 
The meaning of secularism is structured by majoritarianism 
whether it is based on the model of equal treatment of all religions or 
state neutrality. Not only does religion remain present in both models, 
the unstated norms of the dominant religion also remain present. 
Scholars have demonstrated how state neutrality has served to 
reinforce majority practices and the power of the majority to define 
the norms.206 State neutrality does not readily acknowledge the 
 
204. Both judges relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ismail Faruqui v. 
Union of India, (1994) 6 S.C.C. 360, 417 (“While offer of prayer or worship is a 
religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered 
would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place 
has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral 
part thereof.”). Ayodhya, (2010) All. H.C. 161, 164 (Sharma, J.); id. at 2551–52 
(Agarwal, J.). 
205. See Kumkum Roy, Issues of Faith, ECON. & POL. WKLY., DEC. 11, 
2010, at 53 (2010) (who argues that the court ignored the polytheisim in Hindu 
religion and de-recognized the diversity of faith. She posits a critical question as to 
whether the recognition of a personal god is intrinsic to secularism); see also 
Nivedita Menon, The Ayodhya Judgement: What Next?, ECO. & POL. WKLY., July 
30, 2011 at 81, 86–87 (2011). At the same time, some progressive scholars have 
also argued that the case opens the possibility of recognizing the importance of 
faith in individual human life. See Lata Mani, Where Angels Fear to Tread: The 
Ayodhya Verdict, ECO. & POL. WKLY., Oct. 16, 2010, at 10, 11 (2010); Ashish 
Nandy, The Judges Have Been Injudicious Enough to Create a Space for 
Compassion and Human Sentiments, TEHELKA, Nov. 6, 2010, at 16. 
206. Some scholars have unpacked the majoritarianism implicit in the 
American model of secularism, which is ostensibly based on state neutrality. 
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presence of religion since its very premise is about the prohibition of 
religion in politics. It is thus unable to resolve the problem of 
majoritarianism.207 
In contrast, the model based on equal treatment, though it is also 
complicit in majoritarian politics, is better able to acknowledge the 
presence of religion in politics. The extent to which this model has 
been used to advance the cause of the Hindutva parties and the role of 
the courts in enabling the advance of Hindu majoritarianism requires 
serious consideration in light of the Ayodhya decision.208 In this 
section, I elaborate on how the right to religious liberty has served as 
a significant arena for the advance of Hindu majoritarianism. This 
effort has been enacted partly through the Supreme Court in its 
elaboration of the “essential practices of the religion” test and partly 
through the aggressive engagement of the Hindu Right in fleshing out 
the content and meaning of the right to freedom of religion.  
A.    Essential Practices Test 
Freedom of religion by the Indian Supreme Court has been 
addressed through the “essential practices of the religion” test devised 
by it in order to allegedly protect the right to freedom of religion. As 
I demonstrate, in applying this test, the Court has continually engaged 
in determining the core of religious belief for a given religious 
community. I argue that through the essential practices test the 
Supreme Court has been actively involved in the construction of the 
religion that is to be recognized and in the process enacted a series of 
erasures as well as a tended to homogenize religious categories.  
In Shirur Mutt,209 the Supreme Court posed itself the question 
“What is the line to be drawn between what are matters of religion 
and what are not?”210 The idea that religion referred to ones 
 
207. WINNIFRED SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
154 (2005) (discussing the problems with legally enforced religious freedom 
requirements in the U.S. context). 
208. For a discussion of the dangers of majoritarianism that lie within this 
vision of secularism, see Prakash Chandra, The Politics of Indian Secularism, 26 
MODERN ASIAN STUD. 815, 830–37 (1992); Cossman & Kapur, supra note 22, at 
160–62. 
209. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri 
Lakshimindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954) S.C.R. 1005 (India).  
210. Id. at 1022–23 (sanctioning, for the first time, the elaborate regulatory 
regime for Hindu temples and maths, while also widening the definition of religion 
to include rituals and practices). 
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relationship to god or a higher being was rejected in light of the fact 
that some religions such as Jainism and Buddhism do not have a 
belief in a higher god.211 The Court collapsed the distinction between 
belief and practice.212 While it recognized that religion had its basis 
in a system of beliefs or doctrines, it was also more than this 
system.213 The Court stated that, “A religion may not only lay down a 
code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe 
rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are 
regarded as integral parts of religion.”214 The Supreme Court rejected 
the idea that the mere assertion that a practice was part of a religious 
belief would be sufficient to warrant constitutional protection.215 
Instead, the Court formulated the “essential practices test,” whereby a 
policy or law could only be struck down if it could be demonstrated 
that it violated one of the essential practices of a religious faith, 
which was to be ascertained by the doctrines of that religion itself.216 
No outside authority had the right to say what was or was not an 
essential practice.217   
While initially, in the 1950s there was some indication that 
essentiality would be tested on the basis of a community’s own 
beliefs and popular practices, over time the courts have taken on the 
 
211. Id. at 1023. The same is true of a number of philosophical positions in 
India such as the Advaita tradition or notion of non-duality. 
212. Id. at 1025. 
213. Id. at 1023–24. 
214. Id. at 1024.  
215. Id. at 1028–29. 
216. Id. As discussed earlier the doctrine of “essential practices” finds its 
origins in the colonial period as a technique of governance over the native 
population. See SEN, supra note 7. The process of codification and rationalization 
begins with Warren Hastings, the first governor general of India, in 1772, and the 
translation of all Sanskrit and Persian texts into English. See generally NATHANIEL 
BRASSEY HALHED, A CODE OF GENTOO LAWS OR ORDINATIONS OF THE PUNDITS 
(1776); S.N. MUKHERJEE, SIR WILLIAM JONES:  STUDY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
BRITISH ATTITUDES TO INDIA (1968) (on the work of the Orientalist William Jones 
and his codification of Muslim and Hindu law).  
217. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri 
Lakshimindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954) S.C.R. 1005,1025 
(India). This test was reiterated in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 
(1954) S.C.R. 1055, 1065 (India), and Shastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas 
Bhudardas Vaishya, (1966) 3 S.C.R. 264 (India). See Marc Galanter, Hinduism, 
Secularism and the Indian Judiciary 21(4) SYMPOSIUM ON LAW AND MORALITY 
467-487 (1971) (analyzing the reformist approach adopted by Justic 
Gajendragadkar in this decision) This line of cases was relied upon by Agarwal J. 
and Sharma J. in the Ayodhya dispute in declaring worship at the site an essential 
or core ingredient of the Hindu faith.  
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task themselves. The essential practices test was elaborated upon in 
the decisions of Justice Gajendragadkar, who became its primary 
architect.218 In the case of Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain 
Ali,219 Justice Gajendragadhkar stated that the test excluded those 
practices, which “though religious may have sprung from merely 
superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and 
unessential accretions to religion itself.”220 The Justice stated that in 
order for a practice to be regarded as a part of a religion it had to be 
regarded by that religion as essential and integral to its faith. With 
these words the Court established itself as the gatekeeper of religion 
and would take upon itself the role of determining what was “real” 
religion as distinct from mere superstition.221  
The cases discussed above demonstrate the unwillingness on the 
part of the Supreme Court to accept the mere assertion of the 
significance of a particular practice by a group or individual, thus 
placing the judges at the centre of determining what constitutes 
religion. The cases also illustrate the ways in which religion 
continues to be remade by the Court and over time have taken what 
Ronojoy Sen describes as a textual turn.222 As Sen argues, this textual 
 
218. See SEN, supra note 7, at 28 (stating that he “whittle[d] the protection 
of essential practices to those that the court would deem suitable”). 
219. (1962) 1 S.C.R. 383 (India). 
220. Id. at 412.  
221. Judge Gajendragadkar further reinforced this process of “rationalizing” 
religion in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and Others, 
(1964) 1 S.C.R. 561, 622–23 (India). See also Mohammad Hanif Quraishi v. State 
of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731 (where the Court dismissed a claim by Muslims 
who argued that a law prohibiting cow slaughter violated their right to freedom of 
religion as Muslims were compelled by their religion to sacrifice cow at Bakr-Id, a 
religious festival, was not an essential practice for Muslims). A later Supreme 
Court decision followed this move. D.A.V. College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab, 
A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1731 (rejecting the argument that the Arya Samaj is a separate 
religion, a status that they sought in order to claim the autonomy that is granted to 
religious minorities in respect of establishing and administering their own 
educational institutions).  
222. See SEN, supra note 7, at 49–50. This turn becomes evident in a case by a 
woman who claimed to have the right to have worship conducted in perpetuity at 
the Samadhi (a place where realization and state of consciousness free from the 
creation is attained) of her late husband. While the case did not involve an 
interpretation of the freedom of religion clauses, the Court took on the role of 
determining whether or not such a practice was an essential practice of the Hindu 
faith. It held that only practices that had a basis in the shastras or sacred texts would 
be allowed. The recognition of a ground for the perpetual dedication of the 
claimant’s husband for the purpose of acquiring religious merit was not such a 
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turn was similar to the move by colonial judges to ascertain the 
validity of religious practices.223   
This feature of modern states and laws making scripture the 
linchpin for their definition of what is or is not a religion is a 
longstanding characteristic of liberal secularism. Hinduism does not 
have a central scripture, and hence this modern construction of 
Hinduism as text based is dramatic in the shift that it stages. The 
tension is explicitly demonstrated in the Satsangi case involving the 
regulation of entry into a temple. The petitioners challenged 
legislation that was enacted in Bombay in 1947 which was directed at 
ensuring that Hindu temples were opened to individuals of all 
castes.224 They claimed that as they were not Hindus the act did not 
apply to them. The Court held that the Satsangis were in fact 
Hindus.225 In coming to this determination, the bench was compelled 
to consider who was a Hindu.  It declared that the teachings of the 
Satsangis were identical to Hinduism and also that its leader was 
simply one of many reformers of Hinduism.226 The petitioners tried 
to distinguish themselves by stating that they initiated women and 
also permitted Muslims and Parsis to become full members of the 
sect without forcing them to forsake their own religion. They also 
argued that the founder of the sect was worshipped as a god in the 
temple. The decision written by Justice Gajendragadkar held that all 
of these arguments were consistent with Hinduism and its basic claim 
 
practice. Saraswathi Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal, (1954) S.C.R. 277, 288 (India); 
see also Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, (1958) S.C.R. 895 (India) 
(validating a state law allowing Harijans (untouchables) unrestricted access to enter 
a temple that was founded by upper cast Brahmins, despite the right to determine 
who can enter temples, conduct the worship and how to conduct the worship being 
matters of religion, because Article 25 (2)(b), which deals with the State’s right to 
open public temples to all Hindus, took precedence over Article 26).  
223. For a discussion of the academic debates on this issue, see generally 
Bloch, supra note 4. 
224. See Shastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya, (1966) 3 
S.C.R. 242, 264 (India). In India, a category of people described as untouchables 
(Harijans or dalits) who were considered to be unclean, and excluded from access 
to common public spaces including temples. These castes were relegated to low-
status jobs and experienced restricted social mobility on the grounds that they were 
regarded as untouchable. British colonial rule strengthened this caste based politics 
as a measure by which to consolidate their political power over the native subject.  
In post-independent India, the practice of untouchability was banned under Article 
17 of the Constitution and the community has mobilized and become a significant 
political force in mainstream politics, though they still suffer the effects historic 
and systemic disadvantage. 
225. Id. at 271. 
226. Id. at 271–74.  
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to being tolerant and accommodating. The Judge referred to the Gita 
as a central Hindu text to substantiate the idea that the worship of 
other deities was not proscribed by Hinduism and in the process also 
cast Hinduism as accommodating and progressive.227 On the basis of 
this reasoning any discrimination or socially regressive practice could 
be cast as a misunderstanding of the “true” faith and teachings.228  
Relying on a text-based approach, the courts have continued to 
set out the distinction between the true religious experience as 
opposed to rituals and symbols.229 In the case of Hindus, this 
approach is directly connected to the way in which Hinduism was 
articulated by reformists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
through an anti-colonial nationalist lens.230 Hinduism does not have a 
single foundational scripture, yet as many historians of modern 
religion have noted Hinduism during the colonial period came to 
acquire a form modeled on the Abrahamic religions, Christianity in 
particular. Lata Mani has argued that statist projects directed at 
regulating religion since the colonial period have tended to 
essentialize religious claims. In her work on the regulation of sati, the 
practice whereby a widow would immolate herself on her husband’s 
funeral pyre, under colonial rule, she shows how the British, as much 
as the Indian nationalist (primarily Bengali) elite, reified “scripture” 
as the primal source of religion thereby homogenizing and 
essentializing the polivocality of the tradition.231 As a result sati came 
to be equated with Indian culture and ideal Indian womanhood that 
was disconnected from the reality of its actual practice. Similarly, 
Mrinalini Sinha’s work illustrates how the contest over the scriptural 
basis of a tradition was central to the legal reform of women’s 
 
227. The Court was unable to resolve the tension raised in Sri Venkataramana 
Devaru, which involved a similar issue, where in upholding the constitutional 
validity of the Act, the Court acknowledged that the Act may be violating the right 
to religious freedom. (1958) S.C.R. 895, 920–21 (India). 
228. Id. See also Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 S.C.R. 815, 
833–34 (India) (referring to scriptural authority to justify upholding a state act 
abolishing hereditary appointments of temple priests, according to which the mode 
of appointment of a priest was a secular and not a religious function and thereby 
could be regulated). 
229. See Shri A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and 
Others, (1996) A.I.R. 1765 (India) (identifying the rituals involved in an 
appointment process as not being an essential part of religion or religious practice). 
230. See, e.g., King, supra note 4, at 177–79. 
231. See LATA MANI, CONTENTIOUS TRADITIONS: THE DEBATE ON SATI IN 
COLONIAL INDIA 25–26 (1998). 
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rights.232 The nineteenth century colonial encounter came to inform 
the ways in which the Hindu religion has come to be understood and 
taken up in the postcolonial present in law.  
In the contemporary moment, core religious practices have come 
to be identified in Supreme Court decisions as based on foundational 
documents and the construction of a common Hindu belief and 
culture. While the earlier cases tended to offer a wider understanding 
of religion as including rituals and superstitious practices, the 
Supreme Court gradually whittled down the scope of what constitutes 
religion by introducing a requirement that the practice must have a 
scriptural or textual basis.233 In the process a juridically constructed 
“rational Hinduism” has come to define the parameters of legitimate 
faith.234 In articulating a common Hindu culture and belief, the Court 
has cast Hinduism in the same framework as Semitic traditions—that 
is, as a monolithic religion based on foundational documents.235 It is 
also a position that ends up converging with the position of the Hindu 
nationalists.236 The doctrine of essential practices is reflective of a 
“secular rationality” that has emerged with the modern state and in the 
process it has rearticulated religion and its content. In other words, 
rather than being opposing ideologies or understood as unalterable 
essential concepts, secularism and religion have both been mutually 
constitutive.237  
 
232. See generally MRINALINI SINHA, COLONIAL MASCULINITY: THE “MANLY 
ENGLISHMAN” AND THE “EFFEMINATE BENGALI” IN THE LATE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 138–80 (1995). 
233. See SEN, supra note 7, at 14–18.  
234. Id. at 18–25. 
235. In contrast to the endless efforts by the Supreme Court to construct an 
essential or authentic faith, Balagangadhara argues that Hinduism is neither a 
religion nor collection of religions, but a construction of Europeans and their 
Christian theology, which compelled them to look for and see religion in India. It is 
an entity that exists in the western experience of India and writings of scholars, and 
tells us more about the west than about India and Indians. Balagangadhara thus 
argues that the construction of Hinduism had little to do with the demands of 
colonialism or the goals and motives of Indian/Hindu nationalists. See S.N. 
BALAGANGADHARA, “THE HEATHEN IN HIS BLINDNESS”: ASIA, THE WEST AND 
THE DYNAMIC OF RELIGION 507 (2005). See also S. N. Balagangadhara & Jakob 
De Roover, The Secular State and Religious Conflict: Liberal Neutrality and the 
Indian Case of Pluralism, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 67, 83 (2007). 
236. See SEN, supra note 7, at viii. 
237. See Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An 
Incommensurable Divide? in IS CRITIQUE SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND 
FREE SPEECH 64 (Talal Asad et al., eds. 2009). 
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There has been some dissent in the case law from the essential 
practices test and how far the judiciary should be allowed to interfere 
in and reform religion. In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. 
State of Bombay,238 which was a challenge brought by the head of the 
Dawoodi Bohra community to the Bombay Prevention of 
Excommunication Act of 1949, the majority declared that Act was 
unconstitutional as excommunication was a core ingredient of the 
religion and central to the preservation of the community.239 The 
dissent by Justice Sinha focused on how the right to 
excommunication affected the civil rights of the members of the 
community and constituted the basis for upholding the 
constitutionality of the Act on grounds of public welfare.240 The 
judgment crystallises the tension produced by the essential practices 
test and the difficulty in separating “pure” religion from the secular 
sphere, a tension that has produced considerable legal controversy. 
The resort to the texts or scriptures to resolve competing views 
assumes that there is a central text and that a “right” answer can be 
excavated from it. 
Similar sorts of scriptural reification in the context of both Islam 
and Christianity in the modern period have also been enacted and 
such a turn appears to be a development that is internal to the 
“secularization” of world religions. In relation to Muslims, the 
Supreme Court restricted the protection of Article 25 to the Quran in 
the few decisions that it has delivered, and over time tended to reject 
practices that were not specifically stated in the Quran as not being 
essential to Islam and therefore, not within the protective sphere of 
Article 25.241 In the famous case of Shah Bano v. Union of India, 
which involved the issue of the right to maintenance of a divorced 
Muslim woman, the Court attempted to interpret the Quran to 
 
238. (1962) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 496 (India).  
239. Id. at 499.  
240. Id. at 528 (Sinha, J., dissenting). 
241. See, e.g., Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 556, 
566–68 (stating that there is no greater authority for judging religious obligations 
for Muslims than the Quran); Mohd. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1958 A.I.R. 731, 
1959 S.C.R. 629 (where the constitutional validity of the law preventing cow 
slaughter was challenged as violating the fundamental rights of Muslims under 
Article 25 of the Constitution). The Muslim parties claimed that the sacrifice of a 
cow on the occasion of Bakr-Id day was a significant custom. The Court found no 
scriptural reference that made the sacrifice of a cow obligatory, either in the Quran 
or other scriptural texts. While accepting that the practice was a custom, it was 
optional, and not an essential practice as it had no scriptural basis. Id.  
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determine whether such a right was religiously prescribed.242 In 
coming to the conclusion that only a limited right existed, and that 
the secular law would take effect at the point at which religious 
personal law ceased to operate, the Court triggered a national 
controversy and cries of “religion in danger” from the Muslim 
minority community.243  
Pratap Bhanu Mehta argues that the essentiality test serves 
several functions.244 It enables the courts to decide whether a 
particular practice is entitled to the Constitutional protections under 
the freedom of religion clause.245  Such decisions have included 
determinations on whether the setting up of a trust to provide milk to 
cobras in a temple constitutes part of the Hindu religious tradition or 
whether a particular dance form constitutes an essential practice of a 
specific religion.246 At the same time, as Mehta argues, the test has 
enabled the courts to claim that the public purposes of the state are 
the most suitable expressions of the free exercise of a particular 
religion, that is, if the essentials of a religion were properly 
comprehended, then those practices deemed essential would in fact 
justify the legitimate public purpose of the state.247  However, the 
wide berth bestowed on the courts to determine and regulate the 
meaning of religion has raised the question of the possibility of 
religious freedom. While the test has been developed ostensibly to 
narrow the gap between the right to religious liberty and what is 
identified as a public purpose served by the state, there is an 
arbitrariness built into the test that enables judges to discard practices 
that are not proved to their satisfaction to be essential.248  
The move by the Indian Supreme Court to formulate an 
“essential ingredients test” that actually constitutes religion is part of a 
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larger development internal to secular modernity. The attempt by the 
secular state to define “religion” in defence of freedom of religion is a 
necessary and essential quality of almost all adjudications in this 
area. The “essential practices” test finds expression in other 
jurisdictions and is used to construct religion (and secularism) 
through law. As Sullivan argues, when courts have to decide between 
competing religious claims, they ultimately get involved in deciding 
whether a particular religious claim is true to the tradition or not.249 
This means deciding what is properly religious. As a result the idea 
of religious freedom becomes impossible to realize as the court is in 
fact fabricating all religious traditions.250 The continuous adjudication 
of what is true religion or not points to the way in which no form of 
secularism is devoid of religion; that in fact all forms of secularism 
regulate religion and in doing so, change its meaning, practice and 
substance.  
Examples of this practice are found in a number of cases decided 
by the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg upholding the 
ban on the wearing of the headscarf on the grounds that it is imposed 
on individuals and incompatible with the democratic values of a 
liberal state.251 As Peter Danchin points out, such holdings ignore the 
fact that the veil has no singular or fixed meaning.252 Muslim girls 
and women who wear the veil may do so for multiple and 
contradictory reasons. To ascribe it with a single unitary meaning, 
“says more about a particular liberal conception of religion” and 
religious activity and its deep links with Christianity than about 
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coercion or harm in Islamic religious practices.253 What is distinct in 
the Indian example is that its model of secularism explicitly 
recognizes the importance of religion to the operation of state 
governance and stands in stark contrast to the neutrality of the state 
model. 
B.   Hindu Right and the Right to Freedom of Religion 
The specific ways in which the Supreme Court has determined 
the contours of faith in India also converges with the singular, 
monotheistic, and institutionalized construction of Hinduism being 
pursued by the Hindu Right. As discussed throughout this article, in 
the contemporary moment, the Hindu Right has increasingly emerged 
as a significant player in determining the contours and parameters of 
the right to freedom of religion and in turn how Hinduism itself is to 
be defined. Initially, surprisingly little emphasis was placed on the 
right to freedom of religion in the Hindu Rights struggle to pursue its 
understanding of Indian secularism. The BJP, the political wing of 
the Hindu Right, refers to “liberty of faith” in its party constitution as 
a basic objective, but the term is not synonymous with the Indian 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion.254 And this term is 
used in three highly restricted and specific ways.  Firstly, the idea of 
“liberty of faith” or “freedom of worship” is cast in individualistic 
terms: it is the individual’s right to pursue his or her own spiritual 
path; it is not the collective rights of a religious community to any 
form of self-determination.255 In fact, collective rights, such as the 
right of religious and linguistic minorities guaranteed under Article 
30 of the Constitution to set up and administer their own schools and 
colleges using state subsidies and for the purpose of preserving their 
community identity, have been challenged by the BJP as violating the 
Constitutional principle of equality.256   
A second move on the part of the Hindu Right parties is to bring 
the right to freedom of religion under the rubric of Hinduism. 
Hinduism alone is argued by the Hindu Right to provide the 
toleration that is required for individuals to be able to pursue their 
own faith or spiritual path.  The Hindu Right’s argument that 
 
253. Peter Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 663, 747 (2011). 
254. BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY, CONSTITUTION AND RULES ART. II, (Sept. 
2012), http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2012_h/constitution_eng_jan_10_2013.pdf. 
255. Cossman & Kapur, supra note 22, at 149. 
256. Id. See, e.g., BJP ELECTION MANIFESTO 1998, supra note 95, at 36 
(“Amend Article 30 of the Constitution suitably to remove any scope of 
discrimination against any religious community in matters of education.”). 
362 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:305 
 
 
Hinduism is the only truly tolerant tradition, as it does not proselytize 
like other traditions, allows them to claim that only Hindus are truly 
secular, given that tolerance is the basis of Indian secularism.257  
A similar reasoning is used to advance a third and related 
argument that the right to freedom of religion does not include the 
right to propagate one’s religion. Rather, the propagation of religion, 
specifically by Christians and Muslims, is cast as a violation of 
toleration, as the inability of some religions to tolerate others. The 
objection to the propagation of religion has found practical 
expression in the enactment of anti-conversion laws in a number of 
BJP-run states that are specifically directed at curtailing the 
conversions.258 The sphere of freedom of religion for religious 
minorities was thus radically curtailed within the discourse of the 
Hindu Right. The movement retained just enough of the 
constitutional guarantee to freedom of religion (construed narrowly 
as the individual right to worship) to maintain its claim to secularism, 
and to distinguish itself from religious fundamentalism.  
In the Ayodhya case, the claims of the Hindu Right were based 
on a more muscular and substantive notion of freedom of religion 
than had previously been pursued. While the Hindu Right initially 
paid little attention to the right to freedom of religion, preferring to 
focus on the meaning of equality and tolerance, in the Ayodhya case 
they began to argue that freedom of religion was to mean more than 
an individual right to worship. While they continue to use the right to 
freedom of religion to push back against the claims of religious 
minorities for special treatment or accommodation of their religious 
practices, they have simultaneously sought to assert a more robust 
and substantive claim to freedom of religion in their own interests, a 
position recognized most explicitly by Justice Agarwal in the 
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Ayodhya case.  The Hindu parties have pursued a more substantive 
notion of freedom of religion which recognizes that religious identity 
is necessarily constituted in and through a broader community, that 
is, it is a matter of the group’s collective survival: their right to 
practice their religion collectively, including to worship in a place 
that has deep reverence and meaning to the Hindu tradition. The 
Muslim parties did not argue “essentiality” or core ingredients in the 
Ayodhya case. They were more focused on title and possession, rather 
than the right to worship, though providing evidence of worship was 
used to try to establish title/adverse possession. In the Ayodhya case, 
the right to freedom of religion played a much more significant role 
in the arsenal of the Hindu Right than in the hands of the Muslims.   
The argument by the Hindu parties represents a broader tension 
between the individual and collective right to religious freedom that 
is internal to the very secular conceptualization of religious liberty. It 
is a tension that is a feature of religious freedom cases that define 
religion, which is at work in different legal contexts. In other words, 
what is once again evident is that the decision is not simply a case of 
Indian peculiarity or exceptionalism, but is a feature of disputes 
involving religious freedom across the Western and non-Western 
divide. What is interesting in the Indian example is how the Hindu 
Right has been moving between these two articulations to 
simultaneously limit the right to freedom of religion for religious 
minorities, while making more muscular claims to freedom of 
religion for Hindus. Their argument that the majority community 
needs religious freedom in order to protect its traditions is consistent 
with the group formulation of religious freedom. This is an inversion 
of the group conception of religious liberty propounded by the Indian 
constitution in the 1950s as a means to protect minority traditions 
from being destroyed through force or assimilation. 
There is of course nothing extreme in this argument. To insist on 
such a vision of freedom of religion is to do little more than insist on 
the rights that are already recognised and articulated within the Indian 
Constitution under Articles 25 and 26 and is consistent with secular 
modernity. These constitutional guarantees contemplate both 
individual and collective rights to freedom of religion that extend 
well beyond the limited right to worship. But it is the Hindu Right 
that uses the claim of collective rights in the Ayodhya case to 
pushback against what it has perceived to be Muslim appeasement 
and also to more aggressively pursue its claims by appealing to a 
consolidated, homogenous, monotheistic and thoroughly modern 
religious identity.  
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  CONCLUSION 
The Hindu Right has pursued an understanding of the right to 
freedom of religion that is consistent with its broader political project 
to redefine the basic ingredients of secularism in majoritarian terms. 
The inroads of the Hindu Rights have been primarily in relation to the 
concepts of equality and toleration. They have emphasised a formal 
approach to equality, and argued that any recognition of religious 
differences—differences that require recognition in accordance with 
the Constitutional requirement of freedom of religion—becomes a 
violation of the Constitutional guarantee of equality. In a similar vein, 
it is through their understanding of Hinduism as the only tolerant 
religion that the right of religious minorities to profess and propagate 
their “intolerant” religions is cast as a violation of freedom of religion. 
The Hindu Right has effectively inverted the concept of toleration to 
argue that the practices of the religious majority, in this instance to 
worship at the spot where a god was born, is a core ingredient of the 
Hindu faith and hence toleration must be extended in the direction of 
the majority, and not exclusively in favour of the religious minorities. 
In the context of the Ayodhya case, we witness a strategic shift in the 
Hindu Right’s approach to secularism. They focus on pursuing a 
more robust understanding of group rights in and through the right to 
freedom of religion than they had previously done.  
In the Ayodhya decision, the Hindu Right’s mobilization of the 
right to freedom of religion at one level appears to revitalize and 
democratize secularism. It implies that the playing field for minorities 
and majorities is equal. Yet the trouble with Ayodhya case is not one 
of legal discourse alone. The problem is a broader political one in 
which the Hindu Right has succeeded in capturing the popular 
imagination. The fact that the discourse of Indian constitutionalism 
and secularism can be co-opted by the Hindu Right has forced its 
champions to critically examine the structural possibilities internal to 
Indian secularism that can provide for this cooptation.  
The Hindu Right has enacted some undemocratic and politically 
dangerous encroachments on secularism and the right to freedom of 
religion. To push back against these advances requires nothing short 
of reversing the growing domination of freedom of religion as 
defined in majoritarian terms and set out in this article. A re-
democratised revision of freedom of religion will need to break its 
association with formal equality and religious toleration, both of 
which disavow any recognition of religious/group difference. 
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Freedom of religion needs to be seriously engaged with to expose 
how secularism is serving to advance the project of anti-democratic 
majoritarian politics. These politics are increasingly staking a claim 
to define and determine the contours, features, and limits of the legal 
and political management of religious difference through Indian law 
and politics. There is a pressing need to re-appropriate the right to 
freedom of religion to argue for a legal and political order that 
defends the ways of life of Muslims and others who do not share the 
Hindu Right’s majoritarian impulses.  
